A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many by Reinhard Selten
Nr.8
Reinhard Selten
A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,
where 4 are Few and 6 are Manv
Februarv 1973A SIMPLE MODEL OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION, WHERE 4 ARE
FEW AND 6 ARE MANY
It is a widely held belief that in ~perfeet markets the
tendeney, to eooperate depends on the number of eompetitors.
E.H.Chamberlin's distinetion between the small group and the
large group is based on this assumption[ I ] . Cooperative
forms of behaviour like joint profit maximization are assumed
to be typieal for markets with a small number of eompetitors
and non-eooperative equilibria are expeeted, if the number of
suppliers is suffieiently large.
The theory presented in this paper investigates the eonneetion
between the number of eompetitors and the tendeney to eooperate
within the eontext of a simple model. The proposition that
few suppliers will maximize their joint profits whereas many
suppliers are likely to behave non-eooperatively does not
appear as an assumption but as a eonelusion of the theory.
The investigation is based on the sYmmetrie Cournot model
with linear eost and linear demand, supplemented by speeifie
institutional assumptions about the possibilities of eooperation.
Cooperative forms of behavior are modelled as moves in a
non-eooperative game. Game-theoretie reasoning is employed in
order to find a unique solution for this game.
The distinetion between the small group and the
remains unsatisfaetory as long as "small" and
only vaguely defined. Where does the small group
does the large qroup beqin? For the simple model
adefinite answer ean be given to this question:






The formal description of the possiblities of cooperation
is an important part of the model. It is assumed that the
firms are free to form enforcible quota cartels, but before
this can be done, each firm must decide whether it wants to
participate in cartel barqaining or not. These decisions must
be made without knowledge of the corresponding decisions of
the other firms. Those firms who have decided to participate
may then form a quota cartel. A quota is an upper bound for
the supply of a firm. A quota cartel agreement is a system of
quotas for all cartel members. The model assumes that each
firm, which participates in cartel bargaining, proposes
exactly one cartel agreementl) and that a quota system for a
group of firms becomes binding, if all members of the group
have proposed that system.
Before the supply decision is made, the outcome of the
bargaining is made known to all firms in the market. If an
agreement has been reached, the cartel members cannot exceed
their quotas.
This is an extremely simplified picture of cartel bargaining
but hopefully at least some of the relevant features of real
imperfect markets are captured. Note that .nobodycan be forced
to come to the bargaining table. Cartels may or may not include
all firms in the rnarket.Once an agreement has been reached, it
cannot be broken. This means that enforcement problems are
excluded from the analysis. The only kind of agreement which is
allowed, is a system of quotas.
1) One may think of this as a final proposal which is formally
made after extensive informal discussions. The idea that
at the end of the bargaining process the bargainers make
simultaneous final proposals is maybe more realistic than
it appears at first glance. Stevens' book on collective
bargaining[ l3Jconveys the impression that agreemtns are
often reached by virtually simultaneous last moment
concessions after aperiod of apparent stagnation of the
bargaining process.--- - - -- - -- - ---
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Within the framework of these institutional assurnptionsit
is advantageous to form a cartel, but if the nurnberof
competitors is sufficiently large, it may be even more
advantageous to stay out of a cartel formed by others. The
fact that the position of an outsider becomes relatively
more attractive as the number of competitors is increased,
is the basic intuitive reason for the results of this paper.
The task of finding a unique solution for the model presented
in this paper cannot be attacked without putting it into a
wider framework. It is necessary to develop a solution concept
for a class of garnes,which contains the model as a special
case. Only in this way the desirable properties of the proposed
solution of the model can be properly described.
Sections 2,3 and 4 contain some qame-theoretic results which
may be of interest beyond the main purpose of this paper.
1. THE MODEL
The complete model takes the form of a non-cooperative
n-person garnein extensive form, where the players are n firms
nurnberedfrom l,...,n. Por the lirnitedpurpose of this paper
it seems to be adequate to avoid a formal definition of a garne
in extensive form2), but some remarks must be made about the
sense in which the words "extensive form" will be useed.
1.1 EXTENSIVE FORMS In this paper a slight generalization of
the usual testbook definition of a garnein extensive form is
used. It is necessary to permit infinitely many choices at some
or all information sets of the personal players (this excludes
the random player). The set of all choices at an information
set of a personal player may be a set, which it topologically
equivalent to the union of a finite nurnberof convex subsets
of some euclidean space. Apart from that the properties of a
finite garnetreeare retained as much as possible. The set of all
2)See [ 5] or [ 6 J. It will
farniliar with the concept of
with other basic concepts of
be assumed that the reader is
a garne in extensive form and
garne theory-- - - -- -- - -. - - - - - --
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choices at an information set of the random p1ayer is finite.
On1y such games are permitted, which have a finite upper bound
for the 1ength of the p1ay. Another slight deviation from the
usua1 definition concerns the payoff. The payoff of a p1ayer is
areal number or - m.
The games considered in this paper will a1ways be games with
perfect reca11, where each p1ayer a1ways knows all his previous
choices3~ Therefore it is convenient to exc1ude all games which
do not have this property from the definition of an extensive
form. For the purpose of this paper a game in extensive form
will be a1ways a possib1y infinite game with perfect reca11
which has the properties mentioned above. Sometimes agame
in extensive form will simp1y be ca11ed an "extensive form"
or a "game", where no confusion can arise.
It wou1d be quite ~edious to describe the model with the
he1p of the termino1ogy of extensive form games. Instead
of this a set of ru1es sha11 be formu1ated, which contains all
the information needed for the construction of an extensive
form. Apart from inessentia1 details 1ike the order, in which
simu1taneous decisions are represented in the game tree, the
extensive form representation of the model is fu11y determined
by this description in an obvious way. Therefore it will be
sufficient to re1ate on1y some of the features of the model to
the formal structure of the extensive form. This will be done
after the description of the ru1es is comp1ete.
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL.Wherever this is convenient firm i
is ca11ed player i. The set N=(l,...,n) of the n first positive
integers is interpreted as the set of all p1ayers. The subsets
of N are ca11ed coa1i tions.
3)
The formal definition of games with perfect reca11 can
be found in [ 5 J. For infinitegames with perfect
reca11 see [ 1 J.-------
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It is convenient to look at the game as a sequence of three
successive stages: 1) the participation decision stage, where
the firms decide, whether they want to participate in the
cartel bargaining or not; 2) the cartel bargaining stage,
where the proposals are made, which may or may not lead to
cartel agreements; 3) the supply decision stage, where each
firm selects a supply quantity.
At each stage the
stages butthey do
at the same staqe
players know the outcome of the previous
not know the decisions of the other players
or at later stages.
The firms are motivated by their gross profits derived
from the cost and demand relationship of the Cournot model.
It is assumed, that the firms want to maximize expected gross
profits in the sense of probability theory, ~ubject to the
constraint that the probability of neqative qross profits is
zero. This is not unreasonable if one imagines a situation,
where non-negative qross profits are necessary for survival.
1.3 COST AND DEMAND. The same homogenous good is supplied
by all firms. The supply of firm i is denoted by xi. The
quantity xi is a non-negative real number. x=(xi'...,xn)
is the supply vector. It is assumed that there is no
capacity limit. The cost function is the same for each firm:
i = 1,..., n
Fand c are positive parameters. Total supply
n
(2) X = i~l xi
determines the price p
B
B - a X for o < X < - - - a
,
(3) p=
0 for X >
a---.
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Here we assume ~>o and ß > c.
It is a1ways possib1e to choose the
units of measurement for money and for the commodity in such
ß take the fo110wing va1ues a way that the parametem~ and
(4) a = - 1
(5) ß = 1 + C
Therefore we sha11 a1ways assume that (4) and (5) hold. This
simp1ifies our formu1as without entai1ing any 10ss of genera1ity.
Because of (4) and (5) a simple relationship between the total
supp1y X and the profit margin
The variable Pi is the gross
profit without consideration
imagine that the fixed costs
avai1abi1ity of liquid funds
profit of firm i; it is the
of fixed costs. One may
are "prepaid" and that the
depends on the gross profit.
(9) u = i i = 1,...,n
Ui is p1ayer i's uti1ity. Note that Ui does not depend on the
parameter c.4)
4) If (9) did not have certain mathematical advantaqes, it wou1d
be preferable to work with the simpler assump~ion ui=Pi.
The main advantage of (9) is the possibility to prove
lemma 6 in section 4.





L -c for X > 1 + C
Define
(8) Pi = xig for i = 1,...,N.-7-
1.4 THE PARTICIPATION DECISION STAGE. Formally the
participation decision is modelled as the selection of a
zero-one variable zi. Each player i may either select zi=O'
which means that he does not want to participate or zi=l,
which means that he wants to participate. The decision is
made simultaneously by all playersi each player must choose
his zi without knowing the participation decisions of the
other players. The result of the participation decisions is a
participation decision vector z = (zl,...,zn). Those players i
who have selected zi = 1 are called participatorsi the other
players are called ~-participators. The set of all participators,
or in other words, the set of all i with zi=l is denoted by Z.
At the end of the participation decision stage, the vector
Z = (zl,...,zn)is made known to all players. In the cartel
bargaining stage and the supply decision stage the players can
base their decisions on the knowledge of Z.
1.5 THE CARTEL BARGAINING STAGE. In the cartel bargaining
stage eaeh participator i E Z must propose a quota system for
a coalition C which contains himself as a member.
(10)
Yi= (Yij)jEC i i E C ~ Z Yi
. > 0
J -
Yi is called the proposal of participator i. The notation
(y~ .) . C indicates that Yi contains a quota Yi
' for each
-.i;:) JE . J
participatorj E C.A non-participatordoes not make a proposal
and no quotas can be proposed for non-participators. The quotas
Yij can be arbitrary non-negative real numbers ot~. Within the
restriction i E C ~ Z a participator i is free to propose a
quota system for any coalition C he wants. The special case
where i is the only member of C is not excludedisuch proposals
correspond to unilateral commitments5).
5) The re~ult of the analysis would not chanqe, if unilateral
commitments were excluded. The reader will have no difficulty
to see that this is true.-8-
The participators must make their proposals simu1taneous1y;
each participator knows the participation decision vector
z =(Zl,...,zn)' when he makes his proposa1 Yi, but he does
not know the proposals of the other participators.
A quota system Yc for a coa1ition C ~ Z becomes a binding
agreement, if and on1y if the fo11owing is true:
for all i E C.
This means that all members of C propose the same quotas for C.
Unan1mity of the members 1s required for a carte1 agreement.
The system of proposals
(12) Y = (Yi) ie:Z
determines which binding agreements are reached. In (12) the
same notationa1 convention is used as in (10) and (11):
the expression i E Z ind1cates that Y conta1ns exact1y one
proposa1 for each participatori e: Z.
If YC is a binding agreement, then the quotas Yi assigned by
YC to the participators i e:C are ca11ed "binding auotas".
Since it is convenient to define a "binding quota vector"
v = (YY""Yn) which contains a binding quota Yi for every
p1ayer i e: N, the "binding quota" Y1 = m is assigned to those
p1ayers i, who are not in coa1itions for which binding aareements
have been reached.
At the end of the carte1 bargaining stage the system of
proposals Y is made known to all p1ayers. The system of proposals
unique1y determines the binding quota vector y = (V1""'Yn)'
Note that the system of proposals Y contains a cornp1ete
descr1ption of the course of the game up to the end of the
carte1 bargaininq stage, since the know1edqe of Y imp1ies
the know1edqe of Z.-9-
1.6 THE SUPPLY DECISION STAGE. In the supp1y decision stage
eaeh p1ayer i se1ects a supp1y quantity Xi subject to the
restriction
(13) ~ Yi i = 1,...,n
The p1ayers must make their decisions simu1taneous1Yi each
p1ayer knows Z, Y and y, when he se1ects his quantity xi' but
he does not know the supp1y decisions of the other p1ayers.
At the end of the supp1y decision stage, each p1ayer i receives
ui as his payoff. ui is computed according to (2), (7), (8)
and (9).
1.7 SOME FEATURES OF THE EXTENSIVE FORM REPRESENTATION OF THE MODEL
~n spite of the fact that a detai1ed formal description of the
extensive form representation of the model is not needed, it
may be usefu1 to point out some of its features. Let us denote
the extensive form representation of the model byr1. (The
symbol r will be used for extensive forms). The representation
of the decisions in the game tree of r1 fo11ows the order of
the stages and simu1taneous decisions are represented in the
order given by the numberinq of the p1ayers, the lower numbers
coming first. This arbitrary convention about simu1taneous
decisions is needed, since the tree structure of the extensive
form requires a successive reprssentationof simu1taneous choices.
In the information partition, the participation stage is
represented by n information sets, one for each p1ayer: the
decision situations of a p1ayer i at the beginning of the
n~
carte1 bargaining stage correspond to 2 information sets,
one for each Z with i E Zi the supp1y decision stage is
represented by infinite1y many information sets: each p1ayer
has one information set for each proposa1 system Y. A p1ay of
the game corresponds to a trip1e (z,Y,x), vlhere z = (zl,...,zn)
is the participation decision vector, Y = (Yi)iEZ is the
proposa1 system and x = (x1'...,xn) is the vector of supp1ies.- --- -
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It will be important for the game theoretic analysis of the
1 1 extensive form representationr , that the game r has
subgames. Obviously after the participation decisions have been
made and the set of participators Z is known to all players, the
rest of the game corresponds to a subgame; this subgame is
1 n
denoted by rZ. There are 2 subgames of this kind. We call
these subgames cartel bargaining subgames. The cartel bargaining
subgames do not have the participation decision stage, but they
still have the other two stages. After a system of proposals Y
has been made another kind of subgame arises, which is denoted
1
by ry. In these subgames only supply decisions are made; they
are called supply decision subgames. There are infinite1y
many supply decision subgames, one for each Y. Obviously for
1
Y = (Yi)iEZ the supply decision subgame ry is a subgame of the
, 1
cartel bargaining subgame rZ.
A subgame, which contains at least one information set and
which is not the whole game itself is called a proper subgame.
(The information set may be an information set of the random
player.) A game in extensive form is called indecomposable,
if it does not have any proper subgames; otherwise the game
is called decomposable. Obviously the supply decision subgames
r; are indecomposable and the cartel bargaining subgames r~
are decomposable.-11-
2. PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM SETS.
Any normative theory whieh gives a eomplete answer to the
question how the players should behave in a speeifie non-
eooperative game must take the form of an eauilibrium point.
Theories whieh preseribe non-equilibrium behavior are self-
destruetinq proheeies, sinee at least one player is motivat-
ed to deviate, if he expeets that the others aet aeeording
to the theory. Therefore, if one wants to find a rational so-
lution for a non-eooperative game, one must look for equili-
brium points.
For games in extensive form it is important to make a distine-
tion between perfeet and i~perfeet e~uilibrium points. The
eoneept of a nerfeet equilibrium point will be introdueed in sub-
seetion 2.3. There the reasons for the exelusion of imperfeet
eouilibrium points will be explained.
~he solution concept pronosed in this paper does not preseribe
nerfeet equilibrium points hut nerfeet eouilibrium sets. A per-
feet e0uilibrium set may be deserihed as a class of perfeet
eouilihrium points, which are essential lv eouivalent as far
as the pavoff interests of the nlavers are eoneerned. ~ so-
lution eoneept whieh preseribes nerfect equilibrium sets
does not qive a eomnlete answcr to the question how the play-
ers should behave in the game, hut the answer is virtuallv
complete in the sense that only unimportant details are left
open. Such details may be filled in bv non-strategie pro-
minence considerations.6)
Some hasic game theoretie definitions and notations are in-
troduced in 2.1 and 2.2.
2.1 BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES.The way in whieh the words"extensive form"
are understood in this paper has been explained in subsection 1.1.
The games eonsidered here are always with perfeet reeall. H.W.Kuhn
has proved a theorem about finite games with perfeet recall
6) see [ 9J-12-
which shows that nothing is lost if one restricts onels
attention to equilibrium points in behavior strategies.7)
R.J. Aumann has generalized this theorem to garnes in exten-
sive form, where a continuum of choices may be available
at some or all information sets.8) In view of these results
the game-theoretic analysis will be in terms of behavior
strategies.
Let ~i be the set of all information sets U of player i in
an n-person game in extensive form f.
A behavior strategv qi is a system of probability distri-
butions qu over the choices at U, containing one distribution
q for every U € ~i. This i5 expressed by the following no-
tation:
(14) qi = [Tu}U€!J i
A finite behavior strategy is a behavior strategy which
has the property that the distributions q U assign positive
probabilities to a finite number of choices at U and zero
probabilities to all other choices. Such distributions are
called finite distributions.
Por the purposes of this paper it will be sufficient to con-
sider finite behavior strategies only. Therefore from now on,
a strategy will be always a finite behavior strategy. Note
that the pure strategies are included in this definition
as special cases, since a pure strategy ni can be regard-
ed as a behavior strateqy whose distributions q U assign s
1 to one of the choices at U and zero to all others.
The set of all strategies q. of player i in an n-person 1
game in extensive form is denoted by Qi. A strategy combi-
nation q = (Ql' ..., qn) for fis a vector with n components
whose i-th component is a strategy qi € Ql' The set of all
pure strategies ni of player i is denoted by nie A pure stra-
~ combination for fis a strategy combination n = (11,.."
In) with li € nie For every given strategy combination
7) see [ 5 ] p. 213
8) see [ 1 ] p.639-13-
q = (q 1,..., q.) a p3.yoff vector H(q) = (H1(q), ..., Hn (q) )
is determined in the usual way.
The symbol r with various indices attached- to it will be
used for games in extensive form. The same index will be
used for the game and its information sets, strategies,
strategy combinations etc.In this way, notations introduced
for a general game will be carried over to specific games in
extensive form.
2.2 EQUILIBRIUM POINTS. It is convenient to introduce the
following notation. If in a strategy combination q = (ql,...qn)
the i-th component i9 replaced by a strategy ri then a new
strategy combination results which is denoted by q/ri. Consider
a strategy combination s = (sI"" sn) for r. A strategy ri
for player i with
is called a best reply to the strategy combination s. An equi-
librium ooint (in finite behavior strategies) for a game in
extensive form ris a strategy combination s = (sI' ..., sn)
with the following property:
(16)
An equilibrium point can be described as a strategy combi-
nation whose components are best replies to this combination.
2.3 PERFECT EQUILIBRIUMPOINTS. It has been argued elsewhere 9)
that one reauirement which should be satisfied by an equilibrium
point selected as the solution of a non-cooperative game is a
property called perfectness. In order to describe this property
some further definitions are needed.
- -. --..
Consider an n-person
subgame of rand let
bination for r. The
game r in extensive form. Let r I be a
q = (ql' ..., qn) be a strategy com-
system of probability distributions
9) See [10] or [ IIJ-14-
assigned by q. to information sets of p1ayer i in r' is a 1
strategv qil for r I; this strategy qil is ea1led indueed by
qi on r' and the strategy eombination ql = (~I ,...,q~ ) is
eal1ed indueed by 0 on rl.
Aperfeet equilihrium point s = (sl,...,sn) for an n-person
game in extensive form r is an equilibrium point (in finite
behavior strategies) whieh induees an equilibrium point on
every subgame of r. An equilibrium point whieh is not per-
feet is ealled imperfeet.
An imperfeet equilibrium point may preseribe absurd modes of
behavior in a subgame whieh eannot be reaehed beeause of
the behavior preseribed in ear1ier parts of the game; if the
subgame were reaehed by mi stake, some players would be mo-
tivated to deviate from the preseribed hehavior. It is na-
tural to require that the hehavior preseribed by the solution
should be in equilibrium in every subgame, regardless of
whether the subgame is reaehed or not. Any reasonable solu-
tion eoneept for non-eooperative qames in extensive form
should have the property that it preseribes perfeet equili-
brium points.
2.4 TRUNCATIONS. A set M of subgames of a given extensive
form game fOis ealled a multisubgame of f, if no subgame in
M is a subgame of another subgame in M. A proper multisubgarne
of r is a mul tisubqame whieh eontains only proper subgames of f
Let s = (sl,...,sn) be a strategy eombination for f. For every
proper multisubgame M of r we eonstruet a new game in the follow-
inq way: Every subgame r' e M is replaeed by the payoff veetor
HI (Si) whieh in rl belongs to the strategy eombination Si =
( si,..., s~) indueed by s on fl. This means that every fl e M
is taken away; thereby the Starting point of r/beeomes
an endpoint of the new game; the payoff veetor at this end-
point is the equilibrium payoff veetor HI (Si). The new game is
denoted by T( r ,M,s). The games T( r ,M,s) are ealled s-trunea-
tions.-- ----- - __ n___ h ____ __ _ __
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If qi is a strategyfor r, then the strategy induced by qi on
T(r,M,s) is defined in the same way as the strategy induced on
a subgame; the 1nduced strategy assigns the same probability
distribution to an information set as qi does. A strategy
combinationq for F = T(r,M,s) is ca11ed inducedby a strategy
combination q for r, if each of the components of q is induced
by the corresponding component of q.
LEMMA 1. Let M be a proper multisubgame of agame rand let s
be a strategycombinationfor r. Then H(s) = H(s) ho1ds for
the payoff vector H(S) be10ngingto the strategycombinat1on
s inducedby s on F = T(r,M,s).
10) -
PROOF . Consider an endpoint z of r. Let z(z) be that endpoint
of r which is on the p1ay to z. The strategy combination s
generates a probability distribution over the set of all end-
points of r. The payoff vector H(s) is the expected value of
the payoff vectors at the endpoints with respect to this
distribution. The payoff vector H' (s') which be10ngs to the
cOmbination Si induced bV s on a subgame rl of r beginning at
one of the endpoints Z of r is the conditiona1expectationof
the payoff vector at zunder the condition that an endpoint z
of r with z = z (z) is reached. This together with the
definition of rand its payoff function H shows that the lemma
is true.
LEMMA 2. Let M be a proper multisubgame of
be a perfect equi1ibrium point for r. Then
nation s inducedby s on F = T(r,M,s) is a
point of r.
agame rand let s
the strategycombi-
perfect equi1ibrium
PROOF. Assume that s is not a perfect equi1ibrium point. Then
there must be a subgame r, of r such that in this subgame at
least one of :he p1ayers, s~y ~la:er j, has a strategy rj for rl
such that in rl his payoff H!(s'/r!) 1s greater than his payoff
_ _ _ J J _ _ _
Hj(S') at the combination s' induced by s on F'.The.subgame rl
is the s'-truncation T(r',M',~') of some subgame rl of r, where
s' is the equi1ibrium point induced by s on r' and M' is the
set of subgames of rl which are in M.
Id)Only a sketch of a proof is given here, since a detai1ed proof
would require a formal definition of the extensive form.
A detai1ed proof wou1d be ana1ogous to the proof of Kuhn's
theorem2. See [51 p, 206.- -._-- - - --------
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Let r! be that strategy for r' which agrees with r! for the J _ J
information sets in r' and aarees with player j's eauilibrium
strategy s! from s' everywhere else. It follows from H!(s/r!) > _ _' J J J
H .(s')that because of lemma 1 for this strategyr! we must J J
have H!(s'/r!) > H!(s') for player j's payoff in r'. This cannot J J J
be true, since s' must be an equilibrium point.
2.5 BRICKS. Let s be a strategy combination for agame r.
The indecomposable subgames of rand of the s-truncation of r
are called s-bricks of r. (This includes improper subgames
like indecomposable truncations or the game r itself if r is jn-
decomposable. Obviously only the payoffs of the s-Lricks depend
on the strategy combination s. If r is a game in extensive
form, then the game tree of r together with all the elements of
the description of the extensive form apart from the payoff
function (information sets, choices, probabilities of random
choices etc.) is called the payoffless game of r. A payoffless




to s-bricks and payoffless bricks, induced strategies
combinations are defined in the same way as for
truncations.
Obviously the payoffless bricks of an extensive form r genera te
a partition of the set of all information sets of r. Every
information set of r is in one and only one payoffless brick
of r. A strategy combination q for r is fully determined by the
strategy combinations induced by q on the payoffless bricks of r.
Two strategy combinations rand s for rare called brick
equivalent if every r-brick coincides with the corresponding
s-bricks. A set S of strategy combinations for r is called brick-
producing if two strategy combinations rES and SES are always
brick equivalent. Obviously every s in a brick producing set S
generates the same system of s-bricks.
2.6 THE DECOMPOSITIONRANK OF AGAME. A maximal proper subgame
of agame r in extensive form is a proper subgame r' of r which
is not a proper subgame of another proper subgame of r.-17-
The decomposition rank of agame r in extensive form is defined
recursively by the following two properties: (a) indecomposable
games have decomposition rank 1 and (b) for m=2,3,... agame r
has the decomposition rank m if every maximal proper subgame
of r has a decomposition rank of at most m-l and if the
decomposition rank of at least one maximal proper subgame of r
is m-l.
Obviously this definition assigns a finite decomposition rank
to every game in extensive form in the sense of this paper,
since the play length is bounded from above.
2.7 A DECOMPOSITION PROPERTY OF PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM POINTS.
In this subsection a theorem is proved which shows that
equilibrium points have an important property which may
a "decomposition property" since it relates the perfect
equilibrium point to the equilibrium points induced on the bricks
of the game.
Let M be the set of all maximal proper subgames of a decomposable
game r. The s-truncation r = T(r,M,s) with respect to this
multisubgarneis called the indecomposable s-truncation of r.
The notation T(r,s) is used for the indecomposable s-truncation.
perfect
be called
THEOREM 1. A strategy combination s for a garne r in extensive
form is a perfect equilibrium point of r, if and only if an
equilibrium point is induced by s on every s-brick of r.
PROOF. It follows from the definition of a perfect equilibrium
point and from lemma 2, that a perfect equilibrium point s
induces equilibrium points on the s-bricks. Therefore we only
have to show that s is a perfect equilibrium point if equilibrium
points are induced on the s-bricks. In order to prove this,
induction on the decomposition rank is used.
The assertion is trivially true for decomposition rank 1. Assume
that it is true for decomposition ranks l,...,m. Let s be a
strategy combination for agame r with decomposition rank m+l,
such that s inducesequilibriumpoints on every s-brickof r.
Since the assertion is true for l,...,m, the strategy combination
s induces a perfect equilibrium point on every maximal-- - ----- -- ---
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subgame of r.
Assume that s is not a perfect equi1ibrium point of r. If s
were an equi1ibrium point, then s wou1d be a perfect equi1ibrium
point, since perfect equi1ibrium points are induced on every
maximal subgame. Therefore s is not an equi1ibrium point. There
must be a p1ayer j with a strategyr. for r, such that J
H.(s/r.) > H.(s) ho1ds for his payoff in r. J J J
Consider the indecomposab1e s-truncation r = T(r,s). This game r
is an s-brick of r. Let s be the strategy combination induced
by s on rand let rj be the strategy induced by rj on r.
At every endpoint of the game rl= T(r,s/rj) the payoff of
p1ayer j 1s at most as high as his payoff at the same endpoint
in r. This fo11ows from the fact that equi1ibrium points are
induced by s on the maximal proper subgames of r. Therefore
H
J
' (sir.) > li.(s) must hold for p1ayer jls payoff in r since J J
otherwise H.(sir.) > H.(s) cannot be true. This contradicts
J J J
the assumptionthat an equi1ibriumpoint is inducedby s on
the s-brick.
The fo11owing corre1ary is an immediateconsequenceof the
theorem and the fact that the strategy combinations Si induced
by s on a subgame rl of r or one of its s-truncations generate
s-bricks of rl which coincide with the correspondings-bricks
of r.
11) -
CORRELARY Let r=T(r,M,s) be an s-truncation of agame r
in extensive form. Then the strategy combination s is a perfect
equi1ibrium point for r if and on1y if the fo11owing two
conditions are satisfied: 1) the strategy combination s induced
by s on r is a perfect equi1ibrium point for r; 2). For every
rlE M the strategy combination Si induced by s on rl is a perfect
equi1ibrium point for rl.
2.8 PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM SETS. Two equi1ibriumpoints rand s
for agame rare ca11ed payoff equivalent if we have H(r) = H(s)
Dor the payoff vectors of rand s. An equi1ibrium set S for r
is a non-empty c1ass of payoff equivalent equi11brium points, s for
r, which is not a proper subset of another c1ass of this kind.
Obviouslyeveryequilibrium points for r be10ngs to one and on1y
one equilibrium set for r. This equilibriumset is ca11ed the
equilibriumset of s.
11).This corre1ary of theorem1 is simi1arto Kuhnlstheorem3.
See [S],p.208.-19-
Two perfeet eauilibrium points rand s for rare ealled subgame
pavoff equivalent,if for every subgame r' (ineluding the improper
subgame r) the equilibrium points r' and s' indueed by rand s
on r' are payoff equivalent. A perfeet equilibrium set S for
r is a non-empty elass of subgame payoff equivalent perfeet
equilibrium points s for r, whieh is not a proper subset of
another elass of this kind. Obviously every perfeet equilibrium
points s for r belongs to one and only perfeet eauilibrium
set for r. This perfeet equilibrium set is ealled the perfeet
eauilibrium set of s.
.
A set of strategy eombinations R' is indueed by a set R, if
every element r'E R' is indueed by some r E R. The definition
of an indueed set of strategies is analogous.
LEMMA 3. Aperfeet equilibrium set S for agame r in extensive
form induees aperfeet equilibrium set S' on every subgame
r' of r.
PROOF. Obviously the set S' indueed by S on r' is a set of
subgame payoff equivalent perfeet eauilibrium points. Let r'
be aperfeet equilibrium point for r' whieh is subgame payoff
eauivalent to the perfeet equilibrium points SiE S'. Any
SES ean be ehanged by reDlaeing the behavior preseribed by s
on r' by the behavior preseribed by r'. The result is a
strategy eombination a for r. Let M be the multisubgame eontaining
r' ~s its only element. Obviously we have r = T(r,M,q) =
T(r,M,s). It follows by lemma 2 and by the eorrelary of
theorem 1 that a is aperfeet equilibrium point for r.
It remains to be shown that q is subgame payoff equivalent
to the elements of S. If this is true r' must belong to Se.
Let r" be a subgame of rand let qltand s" be the strategy-20-
combinations induced on r" by q and s, respectively. If r"
is a subgame of r" or if rl is not a proper subgame of r",
then H"(q") = H"(s") follows immediately from the fact that
q agrees with s on rand with rl on rl. Let rl be a proper
subgame of r" and let S" be induced by S on r"; then r" =
T(r",M,s") is a subgame of r = T(r,M,s). Hence by lemma 1
we have B"(s") = B"(S") = H"(q") for the strategy combination
s" induced by both sand q on r". This proves the lemma.
Let S be a perfect equilibrium set for r. Obviously for rES
and SES we always have T(r,M,s) = T(r,M,r). Therefore the
s-truncation T(T,M,s) with SES is denoted by T(r,M,S).
The games T(r,M,S) are called S-truncations. Since for SES
the s-oricks are .indecomposable subgames of S-truncations,
every perfect equilibrium set is a brick-producing set in the
sense of 2.5. If S is a brick-?roducin~ set, then the s-bricks
with SES are also called S-üricks and T(r,s) is denoted by
T(r,S). The game T(r,S) is the indecomposable S-truncation
of r.
LEMMA 4. A perfect equilibrium set S for agame r induces a







It follows fram lemma 2 that the elements of S are
equilibrium points. It remains to be shown that a)
equilibrium points rand s with rES are subgame
equivalent and b) if a perfect equilibrium point q
is subgame payoff e~uivalent to the elements of S,
is an element of S.
We first prove a). The perfeet equilibrium points rand s
are induced by some rES and some SES, resp. Let rand s be
such strategy combinations. Let rl be a subgame of Fand let
rl and Si 0e the strategy combinations induced by rand s,
resp. on rl. We must show BI (rl) = BI (Si). This is obviously
true if rl is a subgame of r. If rl is not a subgame of r,
then a subgame of rl exists, ~uch that rl is an SI-truncation
of rl, where Si is the set which is induced by S on rl. Let rl
and Si be the strategy combinations induced on rl by rand s,
resp. We must have HI(rl) = HI(rl) and HI (51) = HI (Si) because-. --- - - - --- ----
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of lemma land H'(r') =
payoff equiva1ent. This
equivalent.
Consider aperfeet equilibrium point q for F whieh is subgame
payoff equiva1ent to the elements of S. We have to show that
q belongs to S. Let q be a strategy eombination for r whieh
agrees with q on Fand agrees with some SES everywhere
else. It fo110ws from the eorre1ary of theorem 1 that q is a
perfeet equi1ibrium point for r.
H' (s') sinee rand s are subgame
shows that rand s are subgame payoff
Assume that q does not be10ng to S. Then there must be a
subgame r' of r where the payoff veetor H' (01) be10nging to
the strategy eombination indueed by q on r' does not agree with
the payoff veetor H' (s') be10nging to the strategy eombination
indueed by s on r'. Obvious1y this subgame r' eannot be in M.
Therefore some s-truneation F'=T(r',M',~) of r' must be a proper
subgame of F. Beeause of lemma 1 the payoff veetor Ü'(q')
belonging to the strategy eombination q' indueed by q' on F'
is the same as the payoff veetor H' (s'). This eontradietion
shows that q be10ngs S. Therefore q be10ngs to S. This proves
the lemma.
LEMMA 5. Aperfeet equilibrium set S for agame r induees an
equi1ibrium set S' on every S-briek r' of r.
PROOF. Sinee S-brieksare indeeomposab1esubgamesof S-trunea-
tions the assertion fo110ws from lemma 3 and lemma 4.
2.9 A DECOMPOSITION PROPERTY OF PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM SETS. In the
fol10wing it is shown that simi1ar results as in 2.7 ean be
obtained for perfeet equi1ibrium sets.
THEOREM 2. Let S be aperfeet equi1ibrium set for agame r in
extensive form. Then a strategy eombination s for r is an
element of S, if and on1y if for every S-briek r' of .rthe
strategy eombination s' indueed by s on r' is an element of
the equi1ibrium set S' indueed by S on r'.--------
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PROOF. The only-if part of the theorem follows from thc definition
of an induced set of strateqy co~binations. The if-part remains to
be shown. This is done bv induction on the decomposition rank of
r. The assertion is trivially true for decomposition rank 1.
Assume that it is true for decomposition rank l,...,m.
Consider a strategy combination s which induces a strategy
combination SES on every S-brick r'ol r.It follows from the
induction hypothesis that for everv proper subga.'11e r"of r the
strateqy combination s"induced by 5 on r"is in thc perfeet
enuilibrium set SN induced by S on rll. Therc is no difference
bet\.,reen an S-brick of fit and the corespondinq S-brick of r.
Let S be the eauilibrium set induced on the indecom~osable
S-truncation r= T ( r , S). The strateqy combination s induced
bv s on the S-brick r belongs to S. Since perfeet e~uilibrium
points s"are induced on the maximal proper subqames r"of r,the
S-brick fis also an s-brick. ~oreover every other S- 'rick is
also an s-brick. It follows by theorem 1 that s is aperfeet
eauilibrium point. We must have H(s) = ~(s) beeause of lemma 1.
This shows t~at s belonqs to S.
COR~ELARY. Let S be aperfeet e0uilibrium set for agame r
in extensive form and let r = T ( r,~t ,S) be an S-truncation of r.
Then a strategy eombination s for r is an element of S, if and
only if the followinq two eonditions are satisfied: 1) The
strategy eombination s indueed by s on f is in the perfeet
eauilibrium set S indueed by S on fand 2) For every r 'E M, the
stratelJv eombination s'indueed by s on f' is in thc perfeet
e~uilibrium set S'indueed by S on r '.
PROOF. The S-brieks and S'- rieks eoineide with the eorresponding
S-brieks. Therefore for SES the indueed strategy eombination s
and s'are in fand r'resp. On the other hand, if s satisfies
1) and 2), then the strategy eombinations indueed by s on the
S-,rieks are in the eouilibrium sets indueed by S. This shows
that the eorrelary follows from the theor~.-23-
THEOREM 3. Let S be a briek--rodue1nq set of strateqv eomb1nations
for, agame r in extensive form. Then S 1s aperfeet equilibriurn
set, if and only if the following two eondit1ons are satisf1ed.
1) For every S-Lriek r' ,the set S'1ndueed by S on r' 1s an
eauilibr1um set for r'. 2) If a strateqy eomb1nat1on s for r
has the property that for every S-briek r'the strategy eomb1nation
s'indueed bv s on r' 1s in the set S'indueed by S on r', then s
is in S.
PROOF. If 1) and 2) are sat1sf1ed, then 1t follows from
theorem 1 that the elements SES are perfeet eouilibr1um points.
Take any fixed rES and let R be the perfeet equilibr1um set
of r. Obviously there 1s no differenee bet\oleeneorrespondinq r-
br1eks, R-brieks and S-brieks. It follows from lemma 5 that an
e0uilibrium set n)is indueed by R on every r-br1ek r'. Sinee every
enui11brium point i5 in a uninuely deterrn1ned enu1l1br1um set,
R' must aqree with the set Si indueed by S on r'. It follows by.
theorem 2,that Rand S are identieal sets.
If S 1s a perfeet eou1libriu~ set, then lemma 5 has the
eonse0uenee that 1)1s satisfied and it folloHs Ly theorem 2
that 2) is sat1sfied, too.
2.10 INTERPRETATION. The notion of aperfeet equilibrium set
is a natural modifieation of the not ion of aperfeet equilibrium
point. Sinee all the perfeet eoui11brium points s in a given
perfeet equ1librium set are subgame payoff equivalent, one ean
take the Doint of view, that the differenees between them are
unimportant.
Theorem 1 shows that aperfeet eouilibr1um point s is fully
deterrnined by the equilibrium points indueed on the s-brieks.
Theorem 3 shows that aperfeet e0uilibrium set S is fully
determined hy the e~uilibriurn sets S'indueed on the 8-br1eks. In
order to deser1be S it is suffieient to deseribe these e~u1l1brium
setsS'.-24-
3. THE SOLUTIONCONCEPT
The game-theoretic conceptsdeveloped here serve the limited
purpose of constructing a theory which is just general enough 1
to provide a solid basis for the analysis of the game r
described in section 1. The solution concept of this paper is
not applicable outside a certain class of games with special
properties. No attempt is made to attack the difficult task
12)
of selecting a unique solution for every non-cooperative game.
For the class of games where it is defined, the solution concept
proposed here is the only one of its kind, which has four
desirable properties. Two of these properties concern the
relatiOnship of the solution of agame to the solutions of its
subgames and trunca~ions. The third property is a symmetry
property. The fourth property is based on the idea that the
players have a tendency to act in their common interest if this
is compatible with the other three properties.
3.1 SOLUTION FUNCTIONS. A ~olution function for a class K
of games in extensive form is defined as a function which assigns
a perfect equilibrium set L(r) to every game r in the class K.
The equilibrium set L(r) is called the L-solution or stmply the
solution of r, where it is clear which solution function L is
considered. The payoff vector belonging to L(r)is called the
L-value of r. The L-value of r i8 denoted by V(r,L) = (Vl(r,L) ,...,
V (r,L». n
It may happen that the solution L(r) is a perfect equilibrium
set which contains exactly one perfect equilibrium point. In this
case the single perfect equilibrium point in L(r) will also be
called the solution of r, where the danger of misunderstandings
cannot arise.
l2)The author is collaborating with John
elaboration of a theory of this kind.
presented here go back to this common
complete. See _'4J
C.Harsanyi on the
Some of the ideas
work which is not yet- -----
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3.2 SUBGAME CONSISTENCY. A elass K of games is ealled subgames
eomplete, if for r E K every subgame of r is also in K.
A solution funetion L for a elass K of games is ealled subgame
eonsistent, if for every r E K the L-solutionL(rl) of rl 1s
indueed by L(r) on every proper subgame rlof r with rl E K.
Note that subgame eonsisteney is not implied by the definition
of aperfeet equilibrium set. If L(r) is aperfeet equilibrium
set then it must induee some perfeet equilibrium set on a
subgame rlof r, but it does not follow, that for rlE K this
perfeet equilibrium set is the L-solution of r.
Subgame eonsisteney means that the behavior in a subgame depends
on this subgame only. This is reasonable, sinee as far as the
strategie situation of the players is eoneerned, those parts of
the game, whieh are outside the subgame, beeome irrelevant onee
the subgame has been reaehed.
3.3 TRUNCATION CONSISTENCY. Let L be a solution funetion for
a subgame eomplete elass K. For any multisubgame M of agame
r E K, the L(r)-truneation r=T(r,M,L(r) ) ean be formed. For the
sake of shortness,this game r is denoted by T(r,M,L).The games
T(r,M,L) are ealled L-truneations of r. The indeeomposable
L-truneations are ealled L-brieks. For the indeeomposable L(r)-
truneation T(r,L(r»the notation T(r,L) is used. T(r,L) is the
indeeomposable L-truneation of r.
A elass K of games in extensive form is ealled L-eomplete,if the
solution funetion L is defined on K and if K is a subgame eomplete
elass with the additional property that for r E K every
L-truneationof r is in K.~-~ --- -----
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A solution function L for a class K of games in extensive
form is, called truncation consistent, if for every r E K
the L-solution L(r) induces the L-solution L(r) on every
L-truncation r = T(r,M,L) with r E K.
It is intuitively clear that a reasonable subgame consistent
solution function L should also be truncation consistent. If
L(r') is the behavior expected in the subgames rlE M, then the
strategie situation in r = T(r,M,L) is essentiallythe same as
in that part of r which corresponds to r.
3.4 CONSISTENT EXTENSIONS. Consider a solution function Ll
for a class Kl of indecomposable games. In the following for
any such L an extension to a wider class K will be constructed.
It will be shown that the extended solution function L is the
only subgame consistent and truncation consistent solution
function for K such that L coincides with LI on KI.
Let L be a solution function for a class K of games in extensive
form. L is called a consistent extension of a solution function
LI for a class KI of indecomposable games, if the following
conditions (J1J and (B) are satisfied:
(A) REGION. The set of all indecomposable games in K is
the set Kl. For m = 2,3,... the set Km of all games r E K
with decomposition rank m is equal to the set of all games r
in extensive form, such that the maximal proper subgames of r
are in the sets KI'...' Km-l and the indecomposable L-truncation
T(r,L) is in Kl.
(B) SOLUTION. For every r E Kl we have L(r) = Ll(r).
If r is a decomposable game r E K, then L(r) induces L(r')
on every maximal proper subgame rl of rand L(T(r,L) ) on
the indecomposableL-truncationT(r,L) of r.-27-
Later it will be shown that (A) and (B) imply subgame
consistency and truncation consistence. This justifies the
name IIconsistent extension".
THEOREM 4. Every solution function LI for a class of
indecomposable games Kl has a uniquely determined consistent
extension.
PROOF. (A) and (B) provide a recursive definition of Land
K. If the classes Kl,...,Km-l are known and L is known for
games in these classes, then K is given by (A). It remains m
to be shown that for every r E Km a unique perfeet equilibrium
set L(r) is determined by condition (B). This can be seen by
induction on M. The assertion is trivially true for r E Kl.
If the assertion is true for games in Kl,...,Km_l, then it
follows by the correlary of theorem 2, that for r E K the m
set L(r) is aperfeet equilibrium set for r.
THEOREM 5. The consistent extension L of a solution function
LI for a elass Kl of indecomposable games has an L-eomplete
region K. The consistent extension L is subgame consistent
and truncation consistent. For every r E K the LI-solution A ~
Ll(r) is indueed by L(r) on every L-briek r of r.
PROOF. Let Km be the union of the sets Kl,...,Km. Let Lm
be that solution function for K ' which agrees with L on R . m. m
The theorem holds, if for m = 1,2,3,... the class ~ is Lm -
eomplete and L is subgame consistent and truneation consistent. m
For m = 1 this is trivially true. Assume that the assertion
holds for Km. It follows from (A) that Km+l is Lm+l - complete.
Sinee L is subgame consistentand L agrees with L for the m m m
proper subgamesof games in Km+l' the solution funetionLm+l
is subgame consistentbeeause of (B).-28-
The truncation consistency of Lm+l can be seen as follows.
Consider an Lm+l-truncation r" = T(r,M'~+l) of agame
r E: Km+l. It has to be shown, that Lm+l (r) induces Lm+l (r")
on r". The maximal proper subgames of f" are Lm-truncatiQns
of maximal proper subgames of f. The maximal proper subgames
of r are in K . Since L is truncationconsistent,L +l(f) m m m
induces Lm(f') on every maximal proper subgame f of r".
The indecomposableL -truncationof f is the same game as m
the indecomposable L -truncation of f". It follows from (B) m
that Lm+l(f) induces Lm(T(r",Lm»On T(r",Lm). This shows that
Lm+l (f") and Lm+l (r) induce the same perfeet eauilibrium sets
on the maximal proper subgames r' of f" and on T(r",Lm).
According to lemma 4 aperfeet equilibrium set is indueed by
Lm+l(r) on r". It follows by the eorrelary of theorem 2 that
this perfeet eauilibrium set must be eaual to Lm+l(r").
It is a simple eonsequenee of the truneation eonsisteney and
the subgame eonsisteney of L, that Ll(f) is induced by L(r)
~
on every L-briek f of r.
THEOREM 6. The eonsistent extension L of a solution funetion
Ll for a elass Kl of indeeomposable games in extensive form
is the only subgame eonsistent and truneation eonsistent solution
funetion L, whieh agrees with Ll on Kl and has the additional
property that L together with its region K satisfies eondition
(A).
PROOF. A subgame eonsistent and truneation eonsistent solution
funetion whose region has property (A) must have the property
(B). Therefore theorem 6 is a direet eonsequenee of theorems
4 and 5.- - - . -- -- ---
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3.5 SIMULTANEITY GAMES. The eonstruetion of a eonsistent
extension is a way of redueing the task of solving the
deeomposable games in K to the simpler task of solving the
indeeomposable games in Kl. For the purpose of finding a
solution for the game r1of seetion 1, the elass Kl must be
larqe enough to generate a elass K eontaining r1. In the
following a elass of very simple indeeomposable games will
be speeified. The elass Kl underlying the solution funetion
applied to r1will be a subelass of this elass of
"simultaneity games".
A simultaneitygame is an n-person game in extensiveform,
where eaeh of the players l,...,n has at most one information
set and where eaeh of these information sets interseets every
play of the game. A simultaneity game ean be interpreted as
agame, where those players, who have information sets, make
simultaneous deeisions without getting information about
any random ehoiees whieh miqht oeeur before the deeisions
are made.
3.6 NORMAL FORMS. Sinee every player has at most one
information set there is no differenee between behavior
strategies and ordinary mixed
Therefore a simultaneity qame
13) normal form
strategies in simultaneity games.
is ade~uately deseribed by its
Let r be an n-person game in extensive form~ he normal form
of r is the pair G = (n,H), where n = (nl,...,nn) is the
strategy set veetor, whose i-th eomponent is the set ßi of all
pure strategies wi of player i in rand where H is the payoff
funetion whieh assigns the eorresponding payoff veetor H(.)=
(H1(~),...,Hn(.) ) to every pure strategy eombination
. = (Il'...'~n) for r. A normal form (withoutreferenee to
an extensive form) is a strueture G = (ß,H) with the same
IJIThis is not true for extensive forms in general. The normal
form does not preserve the disttnetion between perfeet and
imperfeet equilibrium points. In simultaneity games all
equilibrium points are perfeet and every normal form is
isomorphie to the normal form of some simultaneity game.- --
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properties where the 11 may be arbitrary mathemat1eal objeets.
A finite mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution
over ni, whieh assigns positive probabilities to a finite number
of pure strategies 1i E ni and zero probabilities to the other
pure strategies of player i. Sinee only finite behavior strategies
are eonsidered here, in this paper a mixed strategy will be
always a finite mixed strategy.
Two n-person normal forms G = (n,H) and GI= (nI ,HI) are ealled
isomorphie, if for eaeh player i there is a one-to-one mapping fi
from the set ni of his pure strategies in G onto the set ni of
I
his pure strategies in G ,sueh that the same payoff vector is
assigned to corresponding pure strategy combination in both normal
forms. A system of one-to-one mappinqs f = (fl,..., fn) of this
kind is ealled an isomorphism from G to GI .
An isomorphism f = (fl,...,fn) from G to G'ean be extended to
the mixed strategies. For every mixed strategy qi for G let fi (qi)
be that mixed strateqy qi for ~ which assigns the same probability
to a pure strateqy f1(wi) as 9i assigns to Wie In this way every
mixed strategy combinat1on 0= (ql'.",q n) for G corresponds to a
mixed strateqy eombination q 1= (f I(ql ) , . . ., f n (qn)" ) foz: GI.
3.7 SYMMETRIES. Consider a normal form G' which results from a
normal form G by a renumbering of the players. In this case an
J
isomorphism from G to G is called a syrnmetry of G. A symrnetry
of G may be deseribed as an automorphism of G, i.e. a mapping of
G onto itself whieh preserves the structure of G.
A syrnmetry preserving equilibrium point s for a garne r is an
equilibriurn point which is invariant under all symrnetries of the
normal form of r. A symmetry preserving equilibrium set S
60r agame r is an equilibrium set, which is invariant und er all
sYmmetries of the normal form of r. This means that with respeet
to every symrnetry every rES eorresponds to some SES. Note that
an equilibrium point * in a syrnmetry preservinq equilibrium set S
need not be symmetry preserving. Only the set S a8 a whole is- ---- - - -
--- ----. - -- --
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invariant under the symmetries of the normal form of the game.
Aperfeet equi1ibrium point 5 for agame is ea11ed loea11y
symmetry preserving, if a symmetry preservinq equi1ibrium point sJ
is indueed by 5 on every s-briek r"of r. Aperfeet equi1ibrium
set S for agame r is ea11ed loea11y symmetry preserving, if
I
a symmetry preserving equi1ibrium set S is indueed by S on every
S-~riek r'of r . Note thatthe elementsof a loea11ysymmetry
preserving perfeet equi1ibrium set need not be loeally symmetry
preservinq.
The name "loealllis used in these definitions sinee the symmetries
of the normal form of an s-briek or S-briek may not be present in
other parts of the game. The followinq two theorems show, that
loeal symrnetrypreservation is in harmony with the deeomposition
properties of perfeet equilibrium points or sets.
THEOREM 7. Aperfeet equi1ibrium potnt 5 for agame r is loeally
symmetry preserving if and on1y if a loeally symmetry preserving
perfeet equi1ibrium point is indueed by s on every subgame and
every s-truneation of r .
THEOREM 8. Aperfeet equilibrium set S for agame r is loeally
symmetry preserving if and only if a loeally symmetry preserving
perfeet equilibrium set is indueed by S on every subgame and every
S-truneation of r
PROOF OF THEOREMS 7 AND8. Sinee the s-brieksand S-brieks are
indeeomposable subgames of s-truneations and S-truneations resp.,
the if-parts of both theorems follow direetly from the definition
of "loeally symmetry preserving". The equi J.j brium point 5 Iindueed
by s on a subgame or an s-truneation generates s) -brieks whieh
eoineide with the eorresponding s-brieks. This together with
lemmata land 2 shows, that theorem 7 holds. With the help of
lemmata 3 and 4 an analogous argument ean be made in order to
eomp1ete the proof of theorem 8.-32-
3.8 SYMMETRICAL SOLUTION FUNCTIONS. A solution funetion L for
a elass K of games is ealled symmetrieal, if it assigns loeally
syrometrypreserving perfeet equilibrium set L(r) to every
game r E K.
If one player eorresponds to another under a symmetry of an
L-briek r' of agame r E K, then the strategiesituationof
both players in r' is essentially the same. It is reasonable
to expeet, that rational players who are in the same strategie
situation behave in the same way. Therefore it is natural to
require that a solution funetion should be syrometrieal.
If r is an indeeomposable game, then a loeally symmetry
preserving perfeet equilibrium set of r is nothing else than
a symmetry preserving equilibrium set of r. Therefore a solution
funetion LI for a elass KI of indeeomposable games is symmetrieal,
if and only if it assigns a symmetry preserving equilibrium
set L(r) to every game r E KI.
THEOREM 9. The eonsistent extension L of a solution funetion LI
for a elass KI of indeeomposable games is syrometriealif and
only if LI is symmetrieal.
PROOF. It follows direetly from the definition of a syrometrieal
solution funetion that L eannot be sYmmetrieal unless LI is
svrnmetrieal.If LI is syrometrieal,then by theorem 5 for every A
r E K the equilibrium set LI(r) is indueed by L(r) on every
A .
L-briek r of r. This shows that L is syrometrieal, 1f LI is
symmetrieal.
3.9 PAYOFF OPTIMALITY. A player in agame r in extensive form
is ealled inessential,if in the normal form of r the payoffs of
the other players do not depend on the strategy of player i.
This is the ease, if for every strategy eombination _ for r
we have Hj(.) = Hj(~/-l) for every -1 E Ri and every player j
with j ~ i. The players who are not inessential are ealled
essential. Obviously in a simultaneity game a player without
an information set is inessential.--- --.
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If S is an equilibrium set or aperfeet equilibrium set for a
game r, then the payoff veetor H(s) for the equilibrium points
SES is denoted by H(S) = (Hl(S),...,Hn(S». The payoff veetor
H(S) is ealled the equilibrium payoff veetor at S.
Let Rand S be two equilibrium sets or two perfeet equilibrium
sets for agame r. The set S is ealled weakly payoff superior
to R if for every essentialplayer i in r we have Hi(S) ~ Hi(R),
if in addition to this we have Hi(S) > Hi(R) for at least one
essential player i, then S is ealled strongly payoff superior
to R. Aperfeet equilibrium set 5 for r is ealled weakly
subgame payoff superior to another perfeet equilibrium set R
for r, if for every subgame r' of r (ineluding r) the perfeet
equilibrium set 5' indueed by 5 on r' is weakly payoff superior
to the perfeet equilibrium set R' induced by R on r'. Aperfeet
equilibrium set 5 for r is called strongly subgame payoff
superior to another perfeet equilibrium set R for r, if 5 is
weakly subgame superior to Rand if in addition to this for at
least one subgame r' of r the perfeet equilibrium set 5' indueed
on r' by S is strongly payoff superior to the perfeet equilibrium
set R' indueed by R on r'.
Let K be a class of n-person games in extensive form and let A
be a set of solution functions for K. The solution funetion
E E A is called payoff optimal in A if for every L E A and
r E K the L-solution L(r) is not strongly subgame payoff superior
to the i-solution L(r).
The solution concept of this paper is based on the idea that it
is natural to select a payoff optimal solution funetion from a
class of subgame eonsistent and truneation consistent symmetrical
solution functions. If aperfeet equilibrium set S for r is
strongly subgame payoff superior to another perfeet equilibrium
set R, then it is in the eommon interest of the essential players
in some subgames and not against the eommon interest of the
essential players in the other subgames to eoordinate their
expeetations at 5 rather than R. The eoneept of payoff optimality
is similar to the familiar notion of pareto-optimality. The
analogy beeomes elear if one takes the point of view that player i
in one subgame and player i in another subgame have different
interests and therefore should be treated as if they were
different persons.-34-
Definitions which do not take into account the possibility that
tbe interests of the same player diverge in different parts of
the qame, cannot do justice to the structure of extensive form
games. Therefore it is necessary to look at the payoffs in all
possible subgames. In this respect the definition of a payoff
optimal solution function is in the same spirit as the definition
of a perfect ecruilibriuM point.
3.10 DISTINGUISHED EQUILIBRIUM SETS. A distinguished
equi1ibrium set for an indecomposab1e game r is a symmetry
preserving eauilibrium set S for r with the fo11owing additional
property; if R is a symrnetry preserving equi1ibrium set for r,
wn~~l1 ~Q d~EEo~o~e ~rnm ~. then S is strong1y payoff superior to R.
Obviously an indecomposable qame can have at most one distin~uished
eauilibrium set and not every indecomposable game has a
distinguished equilibrium set. An indecomposable qame which has
a distinguished equilibrium set is called distinquished.
Later the class of all:distinguished simultaneity games will be
of snecial irnportance. It is natural to regard the distinguished
equilibrium set of a distinryuished simultaneity game as the
solution of this qarne. It is in the cornmon interest of the
essential players to coordinate their expectations to an
equilibrium point in this set.
In this paper the same intuitive arqument is not applied to
indecomposable qames in qeneral. It is not clear, whether for
indecomposable qames with complicated information structures the
symmetries of the normal form say somethinq meaninqful about the
extensive form in all possible cases. Only within the class of
simultaneity qMJeS it is justified to rely on definitions based
on the normal form."
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3.11 THE DISTINGUISHED SOLUTION FUNCTION. Let K1 be the set
of all distinquished simu1taneity games and let L1 be that
solution function for K1 which assigns.the distinguished
equi1ibriumset of r to every r E K1. The distinquished
solution function is the consistent extension L of this solution
function L1.
The distinguished solution function is the solution concept of
this paper. The fo11owing theorem summarizes the desirab1e
properties of this solution concept.
THEOREM 10. Let K be the region of the distinguished solution
function L. The set A of all subgameconsistentand truncation
consistent symmetrica1 solution functions L for K contains one
and on1y one solution function which is payoff optimal in A.
This is the distinguishedsolutionfunction L.
PROOF. It fo11ows from theorems 5 and 9 that L is in A. It
is a consequence of the definition of a distinguished equi1ibrium
set that a solution function L, which is payoff optimal in A,
must assiqn the distinguished equi1ibrium set to every
distinguishedsimu1taneitygame in K. It fo11ows by theorem 6
that a solution function L cannot be payoff optimal in A, if it
is different from L. It remains to be shown that L 1s payoff
optimal in A.
Assurnethat i is not payoff optimal.Then there must be a
solution function L E A and agame r E K such that L(r) is
strong1y subgame payoff superior to L(r). In order to show,
that this is impossible, it is sufficient to prove that for no
garne r E R a symmetrypreservingperfect equi1ibriumset R can
be found, which is different from L(r) and weakly subgame payoff
superior to i(r). Let K ~e the set of all games r E K with a m .
decomposition rank of at most ffi.The assertion is proved by
induction on m.








Fiqure 2: The indecomposab1e L-truncation f = T(r,L) of the
qame r represented in fiqure 1.
- - ---- --
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The indecomposable L-truncation r = T(r,L) of r is represented
in figure 2. In r player 1 is the only essentialplayer.
Obviously r has a distinguished equilibrium set, whose only
equilibrium point prescribes the left choice. Consequently r
is in the region K of L. The L-solution L(r) prescribes the left
choice at every information set.
The game r has another perfect equilibrium point which prescribes
the right choice r at every information set. This equilibrium
point is the only element of a perfect equilibrium set R.
Obviously R is locally symmetry preserving. The L-value of r
is v(r,L) = (4,4,4). The equilibriumpayoff vector at R is
H(R) = (5,5,5).
ThiR shows that another locally syrnmetrypreserving perfect
equilibrium set can be strongly payoff superior to the L-solution
of a game in K. At first glance one may.think that in view of
such cases it is questionable, whether L is a reasonable solution
function. With the help of the example of figure 1, it can be
easily understood, why this is not a valid counterargument
against the distinguished solution function. At the beginning of
the game r of figure 1 all players prefer R to L(r), but player 1
knows that after the subgame r" will have been reached players
2 and 3 must be expected to coordinatetheir expectationsat
L(r"), since this in their common interest. The fact that R is
strongly payoff superior to L(r) in the whole game will then be
a matter of the paste
Already at the end of section 3.9 it has been pointed out, that
the interests of the same player may diverge in different parts
of the game and.that therefore the efficiency idea behind the
definition of the concept of payoff optimality must be applied
to all payoffs of all subgames rather than to the payoffs of the
whole game only. The numerical example of figure 1 illustrates
this point.-.------
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4. THESOLUTION OF THE MODEL
In the fo11owing the solution concept deve10ped in sections
1
3 and 4 will be app1ied to the extensive form r of the model
1
described in section 1. The upper index 1 in the symbol r
has been used in order to distinguish this game from other
games. Since on1y games re1ated to this game will appear in
the remainder of the paper, we drop the upper index 1 and use
the symbol r without any index in order to denote the extensive
form of the model described in section 1. According1y the
notation rz will be used for the supp1y decision subgames and
the carte1 bargaining subgames will be denoted by ry. Another
notationa1 simp1ification concerns the distinguished solution
N ~
functionL. Here we sha11 use the symbol L insteadof L, since
no other solution function appears in the remainder of the
paper. The distinguished solution of a game will simp1y be
ca11ed the solution of this game.
The computation of the solution of the extensive form r of the
model will fo11ow a "cutting back procedure", which works its
way backwards from the end of the game to its beginning by
solving indecomposab1e subgames and forming truncations. First
the supp1y decision subgames ry will be solved. Then truncated
carte1 bargaining subgames Fz are formed as L-truncations of the
carte1 bargaining subgames. After these games have been solved
the indecomposab1e L-truncation r of r can be formed and solved.
The games whose solutions are found in this way are the L-bricks
of r. Fina11y the solution of r can be put together from the
solutions of the L-bricks of r.
The path to the solution of r is not the shortest poss.1b1eone.
The detours have the purpose to exhibit some interesting
properties of the model and its solution.-- - --- ~ -
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4.1 LF~TA ON THE SUPPLY DECISION SUBGAME. Obviously the
supply decision subgarnesry are simul~aneity garnes.A strategy
qi for ry is a finite probability distribution over the interval
O~xi~ Yi. The following lemma will show, that only the pure
strategies are important.
LEMMA 6. Let s = (sl,...,sn) be an equilibrium point for a
supply decision subgarne ryithen s is a pure strategy combination.
PROOF. In order to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show
that for every strategy combination q=(ql,...,qn) each player i
has exactly one best reply ri which is a pure strategy. Let us
distinguish two cases. In case 1 the supply xi = 0 is the only
pure strategy which guarantees a non-negative gross profit Pi'
no matter which of the pure strategies occuring in the mixed
strategies q. of the other players are rea1ized. In case 2 J
player i can choose a supp1y xi>0 which guarantees a non-negative
gross profit Pi' no matter which of the pure strategies occuring
in the mixed strategies q. of the others are rea1ized. It J
fo1lows from (9) that in case 1 the supp1y xi= 0 is the only
best reply of player i.
Now consider case 2. Let Xj be the greatest supply xj such
that qj assigns a positive probability to xjo
Define
n




Obviously we must have Xi < 1. In order to be sure to receive
a non-negative gross profit, player i must select a supply xi
/\ '"
in the closed intervall 0 ~ xi ~ xi' where xi is the minimum of
Yi and I-Xi. It follows from gel - X, that in this intervall the
expected gross profit of player i is a strictly concave quadratic
function. Consequently player i has exactly one best reply, which
roJ ,..- "-
is a supply xi with 0 ~ ,xl~ xi.
REMARK. If the players had the utility function ui=Pi instead
of (9), a similar argument would not go through, since over the
whole range xi ~ 0, the variable Pi is not a concave function
of xi.
Lemma 1 shows that we can restrict our attention to pure strategy
combinations. In the following a pure strategy combination forry
is identified with the corresponding supply decision vector
x= (xl'... ,xn) .
In lemma 2 a function ~i(Xi) is introduced, which is called
the reaction function of player i. This function is indeed
the familiar reaction function from the Cournot oligopoly theory.
In lemma 8, equation (21) we shall define a related function
14)
1)i (X), '.,hichis called the fitting-in-function . The fact
that this function depends on the total supply X, rather than on Xi'
makes it a useful instrument for the analysis of the Cournot model.
LEMMA 7. Let (Xl'...,Xn) be a pure strategy combination





(19) 'tXi) = max 0, min [~ ' Yi~
is player i's best reply to (Xl'...,Xn)
l4)
The concept of a fitting-in function has beeen introduced for
a wide class of oligopoly models in [12J. The German name is
"Einpassungsfunktion".-43-
PROOF. Consider first the ca se Xi ~ 1. In this ca se xi = 0 is
the only supply which gives players i a non-ne9ativegross profit
and ~i(Xi) = 0 is the best reply to x = (Xl'...,Xn).
In the case Xi < 1 player i 18 gross profitis negative outside
the intervall 0 ~ xi ~ 1 - Xi. Within this intervall the function
xi (l-Xi-xi) assumes its maximum at xi = (1 - Xi)/2. This shows
that for Xi < 1 the best reply to (xl'... ,xn) is given by (19).
LEMMA 8. Let ~ be a supply decis10n subgame with the binding
quota vector y = (Yl'...'vn). Define
r '
(20) ni (X) = max 0, min l-X'Yi
for i = l,...,n (the function ni (X) is called player i's
fitting-in function). For every X~ 0 and for i=l,...,n the
function ni (X) satisfies the condition
and for every fixed X ~ 0 the only solution of the equation
is
PROOF. 'i (Xi) is monotonically non-increasing. Therefore
~i (X-xi)-xi is monotonically decreasing in xi. Consequently for
---
every X 0 there is at most one xi satisfying (22) . It remains
to be shown that (21) is true, (19) yields
.- l-X+n (X} :"1
(23) 'i (X-f"Ii(X) ) >
max 10, min f i 'Y1\i L . 2 .::l-44-
In order to prove (21) we distinguishthe followingthree







In ca se (24) we have ~i(X) = o. If we insert this on the right
side of (23), we see that because of (24) condition (21) 1s
satisfied. Now consider case (25). In this case ~i(X) is equal
to I-X. It is clear from (23) and (25) that (21) holds in this
case too. In case (26) we have ~i(X) is equal to Vi. Inequality
(26) implies
l-X+Yi
Yi ~ 2 (27)
This shows that (21) is satisfied.
4.2 THE SOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY DECISION SUBGAME
In the following the results of the last section will be used in
order to find the solutions of the supply decision subgames.
For this purpose we introduce the total fitting-in function ~(X):
(28)






Figure 3: The fitting-in diagram for n=3 and Y1= .6, ,Y2= .4,
Y3=.1 . The intersection.of I"\(X) with the 450-1ine i5 at















....Consider the pure strategy equilibrium point (Xl'...,Xn) of ry
and let X be the total supply belonging to x=(xl'...,xn). It
follows from the definition of an equilibrium point and from
lemma 7 that (22) must hold for i=l,...,n. In view of lemma 8
this means that we must have xi= 0i(X). Hence we also must
have
(29) X = 0 (X)
Moreover, it is clear that any solution X of (29) together with
equations (21) generates an equilibrium point (xl'...,xn).
A convenient graphical representation of the solutions of (29)
can be given with the help of a diagram which shows o(X) and
o
the 45 -line. This diagram will be called the fitting-in diagram.
An example is given in figure 3. In the fitting-in diagram the
solutions of (29) are represented by the intersections of o(X)
with the 450-line. Since o(X) is a continuous non-increasing
function with 0(0) ~O and 0(1) = 0, it is clear that o(X) has
o
exactly one intersection with the 45 -line and ry has exactly
one equilibrium point, whose total supply X satisfies the
inequality
(30) 0 ~ X < 1
The resultswhich just have been derived, are summarized by the
following theorem.
THEOREM 11. Let ry be a supply decision subgame. Then ry has a
unique equilibrium point. This equilibrium point is an equilibrium
p~lnt (Xl'...,Xn) in pure strategies. The total supply X
belonging to (xl'...,xn) is the unique solution of the equation
X='1 (X) and satisfies the inequality 0 ~ X < 1. Moreoverwe have
xi = '1i (X) for i = l,..~n. (Here 0 and 0i are defined as in
(28) and QO) resp. ).-47-
REMARK. Since ry has only one equilibrium point, the solution
L(ry) is the equilibrium set with this equilibrium point as its
single element. Obviously ry is a distinguished simultan~ity
game.
4.3 PROPERTIES OF THE SUPPLY DECISION EQUILIBRIUM.
In this section the determination of the solution of the cartel
bargaining subgames rz will be prepared by the derivation of
some results on the equilibrium points of the supply decision
subgames. We first look at the special case of a supply decision
subgame ry with a binding quota vector (Yl'...'Yn) with Yi = m
for i = l,...,n. We call this case the unrestricted case.
The unrestricted case is an important limiting case. If no cartel
agreements were possible then the equilibrium point of the
unrestricted case would be the non-cooperative solution of the
model.
LEMMA 9. Let ry be a supply decision subgame with a binding
quota vector y = (Yl'...'Yn) with Yi = m. Then the components of
the equilibrium point (xl'...,xn) for ry are given by
(31) x = 1 f i n+l or i = l,...,n
and player ils profit Pi at (xl'...,xn) is givBn by
(32) 1 P =--
i (n+l)2 for i = l,...,n.. - ----
-48-






X = .2!- n+l
is a consequence of (34) and (20).
and (8) .
Equation (32) follows
LEMMA 10. Let ry be a supply decision subgarneof a given cartel
bargaining subgarnerz. Let (Xl'...,Xn) be the equilibriurnpoint
of ry and let k be the nurnberof non-participators (the nurnber
of players in N-Z). Define
PROOF. Since no quotas are fixed for non-participators we have
(38) Yi = - for i E N-z
(35) Xz = LXi
iEZ
Then the following is true:
(36 ) xi = k ; 1 (l-Xz)
for i E N-Z
(37) Xz
< --U=.k - . n+l
This together with (20) and (30) yields








k(l-X -x ) Z N-Z
k
k+l (l-XZ)
(39) shows that the equilibrium supply xi is the same for
all i e N-Z. This together with (42) proves (36). Because
of (42) we have
(43) 1 x = 1 - Xz - XN-Z
X = k~l (l-Xz) (44) 1
The inequality
(45) Mi< 1 - X for i E Z
is a consequence of (20)and (30). This together with (44) yields
(46)
(46)
k X <.~ (1-X ) Z- .L +'" Z
is equivalent to (37).
REMARK. Note that because of (31) in the unrestricted case X
Z
is equa1 to the upper bound on the right side of (37).
LEMMA 11. Under the assumptions of lemma 10 let Pi be p1ayer ils
gross profit at the equilibrium point (xl'...,xn) of ry.
Define
(47)
Then the following is true:
(48) Pz = k~1 Xz(l-Xz)~~-50-
PROOF. Because of (30) we can write
(49 ) P = X (I-X) Z Z
This together with (44) yields
1
(50) Pz = k+l XZ(l-XZ)
The right side of (50) assumes its maximum at Xz=1/2.
This proves (48).
4.4 THE SOLUTIONS OF THE TRUNCATED CARTEL BARGAINING SUBGAMES.
Let rZ be a cartel bargaining subgame. The indecomposable
L-truncation rZ=T(r,L) of rZ is called the truncated cartel
bargaining subgame for z. In this section it will be shown
that rz has a distinguished equilibriurnset.
Consider an equilibrium point Sz of a truncated cartel bargaining
subgame fz, such that the equilibrium payoffs at Sz are
the gross profits (32) obtained in the unrestricted case of a
supply deci,sionsubgame. Formally an equilibrium point of this
kind may very weIl involve cartel agreements as we shall see
in lemma 12, but such cartel agreements have no economic
significanceand thereforewill be called inessential.No cartel
bargaining is necessary in order to achieve the payoffs (32).
The solution of fz depends on the number k of players in N-Z.
As we shall see, for k ~(n-l)/2 the equilibriurnpayoffs connected
to the equilibrium points in L(fz) are the gross profits (32).
In this case only inessential cartel agreements result from the
equilibriurnpoints in L(fZ). For k «n-l)/2 the situation is
different. Here the equilibriurnpayoffs at L(rZ) are greater
than those of the unrestricted case of a supply decision subgame.
Generally the solution L(fz) of a truncated cartel bargaining
subgame contains many equilibriurnpoints. There are two reasons
for this: different proposal systems may lead to the sarnequota
vector and different quota vectors may lead to the same
equilibriurnpayoffs in the supply decision subgame.- - - ---
-51-
For our purposes, it is not necessary to describe L(fz) in
detail. It is sufficient to exhibit one equilibrium point
in L(rz) and to describe L(fz) as that equilibrium set, which
contains this equilibrium point.
LEMMA 12. Let Fz be a truncated cartel bargaining subgame.
Then the following system of proposals Y is an equilibrium
point in pure strategies for Fz:
(51) Y = (Yi)itZ
Yi = (Yij)jtZ
where for every itZ
with vij
= 00
The binding quota vector (Yl'...'Yn) genera ted by this
equilibrium point has the prop~rty Yi=- for i=l,...,n.
PROOF. Formally an agreement results from Y, but this agreement
is an inessential one, since the binding quota vector has the
property Yi= 00 for i = l,...,n.
We must show that no deviation of a player jtZ can improve his
gross profit. The only deviation which can change the binding
quota vec~or is a deviation to a proposal for the one-person
coalition {j} containing j as its only element. Let y! be the J
quota which player i proposeS for himself. The new binding quota
vector has Yj as its j-th component and Yi= 00for all i + j.
The proposal system (51) has the result that all players get the
gross profit from (32). It is clear from the proof of lemma 4
that the new bindinq quota cannot lead to a different result
unless we have
(52) xj = m~n[l-x,YjJ = yj
Because of
(53) xi = l-X for i + j
we must have
(114)
X = Yj + (n:l) (l-X)
(55) n-l !1 X = - + n n
l-y!







Because of (7),(8) and (56) p1ayer j's gross profit p! after J
the deviation can be written as fo11ows:
In the interval 0 ~ yj ~ 1/ (n+1) the profit Pj is an increasing
function of y!. Thereforewe must have J
(60) Pj =~ . n~l (l-n;l) = (n~l)2
This shows that the deviation to Yi does not improve player j's
gross profit above tts equilibrium va1ue from (32). Consequent1y
(51) is an equi1ibrium point of rz.
THEOREM 12. Let rz be a truncated carte1 bargaining subgame




Then rz is a distinguished simu1taneity game and the
distinguished equi1ibrium set Sz contains the pure strategy
equi1ibrium point (51) from lemma 12. The equi1ibrium payoffs at
Sz are the gross profits (32) from lemma 9.
PROOF. The symmetries of rZ correspond to those permutations
of N which leave Z and N-Z unchanged. Since at the equi1ibrium
point (51) the players in Z have equa1 payoffs and the p1ayers
in N-Z have equal payoffs, the equi1ibrium set Sz of this
equilibrium point is symmetry preserving.- -- - - --- -
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We have to show that rZ is a distinguished simu1taneity game
and that Sz is the distinguished equi1ibrium set of rz. Since
the p1ayers in N-Z are inessentia1 and since every symmetry
preserving equi1ibrium set must give the same payoff to all
p1ayers in Z, it is sufficient to show, that the joint gross
profit Pz of the p1ayers in Z at (51) cannot be surpassed by
the joint gross profit of the p1ayers in Z at any other
equi1ibri,um point of rz.
For any supp1y decision subgame of rz the joint equi1ibrium
supp1y Xz of the p1ayers in Z is bounded by the right side of
(37). If the lower bound for k from (61) is inserted on the
right side of (37) we get
1
(62) XZ~2
It can be seen from (50),that in the interval 0 ~ XZ~ 1/2
the joint gross profit Pz of the p1ayers in Z is a monotonica11y
increasing function of XZ. Therefore Pz cannot be greater than
the profit at the upper bound of Xz in (37) which is assumed
at the supp1ies specified in (31). This shows that the
equi1ibrium set Sz is the distinguished equi1ibrium point of
rand that the equi1ibrium payoffs at S are the gross profits
z -1 z
(32). Obvious1y rz is a distinguishedsimu1taneitygame.
LEMMA 13. Let rz be a truncated cartel bargaining subgame,
where the number k of non-participators satisfies the inequa1ity
(63) k ~ n;l
Then the fo11owing system of proposals Y is an equi1ibrium
point in pure strategies for rz.
(64) Y = (Yi)iEZ where for every i E Z
Yi = (Yij)iEZ with Yij = ~/:_~\ for all j E Z-54-
The equilibrium payoffs at this equilibrium point are the
following gross profits:
PROOF. Let r be the supply decision subgame resulting from y
(64) and let (Xl'...,Xn) with the total supply X be the
equilibriumpoint of ry. Obviouslythe binding quota vector
(Yl'...'y) of r is as folIows: n y
1
2 (n-k) (67) for i E Z
(68) GD for i E N-Z
Because of (28), (29) and (30) the total supply X satisfiesthe
condition
(69) X = k(l-X) + (n-k) ~in [1-X'2{~_k\J






If (70) were wrong, (69) would assume the form
(71) X = n (I-X)
This yields
(72) X = n
n+l
Consequently (70) cannot be wrong unless the follwwing is true
(73) 1 < 1
n+l 2 (n-k)
(65) Pi =
1 for i E Z
4 (n-kX(k+l)
(66) P - 1 for i E N-Z i -
4(k+l)2-55-
It is an immediate consequence of (63) that we must have
(74)
n-1
2(n-k) ~ 2 (n--r) = n + 1
This contradicts (73). Therefore (70)
we have xi = ~i (X). With the he1p of
x - 1 i - 2(n-k)
is correct. By theorem 11
(20) this yie1ds
(75) for i E Z
The equi1ibrium supplies for i E N-Z, can be computed from
(75) and (36). We receive
(76) 1
21k+l) for i E N-Z




It follows that the gross profits at (Xl'...,Xn) are the gross
profits Pi in (65) and (66).
It remains to be shown that the proposal system (64) is an
equilibrium pointof r . It is not necessaryto lookat the z
inessential playersin N-Z. Considera playerj E Z. Player j
has two kinds of deviations. Some deviations have the result
that the new binding quota vector gives a quota of ~ to every
player including player j. As we can see from lemma 9, if this
happens player jls payoff after the deviation is equal to l/(n+l)2.






This inequality togehher with (65) has the consequence that a
deviation of the kind considered above is unprofitable. The only
other possibility of a deviation of a player j E Z is a deviation
to a proposal for the one-person coalition {j} which would result
in some binding quota yj for player j and binding quotas Yi=-
for all other players i.--- ---
-56-
From the fact that the proposal system (51) from lemma (12)
is an equilibrium point where according to lemma 9 every player
2 '
receives l/(n+l) as his equilibrium payoff, we can conclude
that such deviations are not more profitable than those which
yield binding quota vectors Yi = m for all players i.
In order to prove that (63) implies (78), we observe that the
partial derivative of 4(n-k) (k+l) with respect to k is
4 (n-1-2k) . Obviously this is positive, if k satisfies
o ~ k < (n-l) /2. Therefore in the interval 0 ~ k ~ (n-l)/2 the
gross profit Pi in (65) is a monotonically decreasinq function of 2
k. At k=(n-l)/2 the gross profit Pi assumes the value l/(n+l) .
This shows that (78) holds for k < (n-l)/2.
REMARK. In the conrse of the proof of lemma 13, it has been
shown that for k ~ (n-l)!2 the gross profit (65) of a participator
2
is bounded by (78). The lower bound l/(n+l) is the supply
decision equilibrium payoff of the unrestricted case. If k is
equal to (n-l)/2 then (64) is an equilibrium point in the
equilibrium set S from theorem 12. In this case the cartel z
agreement resulting from (64) is inessential. Note that both for
i E Z, and i E N-Z the equilibriumpayoffs become smaller if the
number k of non-participators is increased within the interval
o < k < (n-l)/2.
-
THEOREM 13. Let r be a truncated cartel bargaining subgame, z
where the number k of non-participators satisfies the inequality
n-l
(79) k < ~
Then r is a distinguishedsimultaneitygame and the distinguished z _ _
equilibrium set Sz of rz contains the pure strategy equilibrium
point (64). The"equilibrium payoffs at Sz are the gross profits
.(65)' and' (66) from lemma 13.-57-
PROOF. Let Sz be the equilibrium set
(64). In the same way as in the proof
that Sz is symmewry preserving.
of hhe equilibrium point
of theorem l~ we can see
.. .
In order to show that rz is a distinguished simulteneity game
and Sz is the distinguished equilibrium set of rz it is
sufficient to show that the joint equilibrium payoff of the
players in Z cannot be surpassed by the joint gross profit of
the players in Z at any other equilibrium point of TZ. It can
be seen from (65) that the joint equilibrium payoff of the
pl,yers in'Z is equal to the upper bound in (48). This upper
bound cannot be surpassed by the joint equilibrium gross profit
Pz of the players in Z in any supply decision subgame of rZ.
This completes the proof.
REMARK. Generally Sz contains many equilibrium points. This
can be seen easily for the trivial case n=l, and k=O where any
binding quota Yl~1/2 is compatible with the monopolistls
optimal supply xl = 1/2. For n~l, it is also possible that Sz
contains more than one equilibrium point. In order to see this,
one may look at the case n=4, k=O. There one can find
equilibrium points which achieve the binding quota vector of
(64) by two 2-person agreements. Since this is an unimportant
detail, no proof is given here.
4.5 THE PARTICIPATION DECISION BRICK. Let f be the
indecomposable L-truncation f = T1r,L) of the extensive form
of the model.rwill be called the participation decision brick.
~n f each player i has two strategies: he may choose zi = 0
or zi = 1. The payoff function of the participation decision
brick is described in theorem 14. Up to n=lO, the numerical
values of the payoffs are tabulated in table 1.
THEOREM 14. Let Z = (Zl'...'Zn) be a pure strategy combination
for the participation decision brick rand let Z be the set of
all players i with zi = 1 (the set of all participators). Let
k be the number of players in N-Z. Then player ils payoff Hi(Z)
in f is as foliows:-58-
Table 1: Payoffs for the participation decision brick up to n = 10
Number Number Payoff Payoff
of of of a of a
players non-partici- participator non-partici-
pators pator
n = 1 k = 0 .25000 -
k = 1 - .25000
n = 2 k = 0 .12500 -
k > 1 .01111 .11111
n = 3 k = 0 .08333 -
k 1 .06250 .06250
n = 4 k = 0 .06250 -
k = 1 .04167 .06250
k 2 .04000 .04000
n = 5 k = 0 .05000 -
k = 1 .03125 .06250
k 2 .02778 .02778
n = 6 k = 0 .04167 -
k ::: 1 .02500 .06250
k = 2 .02083 .02778
k 3 .02041 .02041
n = 7 k = 0 .03571 -
k = 1 .02083 .06250
k = 2 .01667 .02778
k 3 .01562 .01562
n = 8 k = 0 .03125 -
k = 1 .01786 .06250
k = 2 .01389 .02778
k = 3 .01250 .01562
k 4 .01235 .01235
n = 9 k = 0 .02778 -
k = 1 .01562 .06250
k = 2 .01190 .02778
k = 3 .01042 .01562
k 4 .01000 .01000
n = 10 k = 0 .02500 -
k = 1 .01389 .06250
k = 2 .01042 .02778
k = 3 .00893 .01562
k = 4 .00833 .01000
k .?-.. 5 .00826 .00826-59-
r---!
, (n+1) 2
for i - 1 if n-1 - , ..., n, k~-
2
(80) for i E Z, if k
n-1 <-
2
for i E N-Z, if k < n-1 2
PROOF. (80) is an immediate consequence of theorems 12 and 13.
4.6 PROPERTIES OF THE PAYOFF OF THE PARTICIPATION DECISION BRICK.
In t~is section several useful properties of the payoff function Hi
of fshall be derived.
LEMMA 14. Let Z = (zl,...,zn) be a p~e strategy combination
for the participation decision brick rand let i be one of the
players. Let m be the number of non-participators in N-[i'~.
Define
r 1
(82) I 4 en-m) (m+ for m < n-1 Ben,m) = I 1) 2 ')
,
; 1
























z - 1 i -
immediate consequence of theorem 14.
have k = m+l and in the case of
LEMMA 15. Let m and n be integers with 0 ~ m ~ n. Define
(85) D(n,m) = A(n,m) - B(n,m)
We have
PROOF. (86) is an immediate consequence of lemma 14. The
equation D (4,0) = 0 fo1lows by (86) . Now asswne n ~ 5 and
m ~ (n-4)/2. Under this condition (88) is equivalent to
(91) .(n-m) (m+l) - (m+2)2. > o.
Hi(Z) = A (n,m)
Hi(Z) = B(n,m)
The lemma i9 an
case of zi= 0 we





41n-mflm+l) tor m- 2
(86) D(n,m)=
1
1 1 n-3 .< m < n-2
(n+l)2
-






(8?) D(4,0) = 0
(88) D (n,m) ) 0 for n S
and m.:5n;4
(89) D (n ,m) < 0 for n-3 n-2
-r m
(90) D(n,m) = 0 for n-1 m >- - 2-61-
Because of n~5 this inequality holds for m = o. Since
m~ (n-4)/2 implies n~2m + 4 we receive an upper bound for
the left side of (91) if we substitute m + 4 for n-m. Thus
for m >0 inequality (91) follows by (92).
(92) (tn + 4)(m+l)
2
(rn+2) = rn > 0
In order to show that (89) is true, we have to examine whether
2 (93) 4 (n-m) (m+l) - (n+l) < 0
holds for m=(n-3)/2 and ~or m=(n-2)/2.
expression on the left side of (93) is
m=(n-2)/2 we receive -1. Equation (90)
For m=(n-3)/2 the
equal to -4 and for
is implied by (86).
LEMMJI. 16. Let m and n be integer s wi th 0 ~ m.5.n-1. Them we have
(97) B(n,m+l) - B(n,m) ~ 0
n-l
for m ~~
PROOF. (95) and (97) are an immediate consequence of (81) and
(82). Obviously (94) holds for m «n~5)/2. Since both for
2
m=(n-5)/2 and m=(n-4)/2 the expression 1/4(m+2) is greater
than 1/(n+l)2, inequality (94) holds for these values of m too.
In order to show, that (96) is true we observe that the
derivation of(n-m)(m+l)with respect to m is equal to n-l-2m.
For m «n-l)/2 this is positive. Therefore (96) holds for
m «n-3)/2. For m=(n-3)/2 we have
2
(98) 4 (n-m) (m+l) = (n+3) (n-l) < (n+l)
and for m=(n-2)/2 we receive
2
(99) 4 (n-m) (m+l) = (n+2) n < (n+l)
Therefore (96) holds for these values of m too.
(94) A(n ,m+l) - A(n,m) < 0 for rn n-3 <- 2
(95) A(n,m+l) = 0 n-3
- A(n,rn) for m
(96) B(n,m+l) - B(n,m) < 0
n-l
for m <-62-
LE~mA 17. The payoff function H of the participation
decision brick r has the followingproperty:
- 1
Hi(Z) ~ ,... .-I
and for every pure strategy combination Z = (zl,...,zn)
(100) f or i = 1 , . . . ,n
PROOF. Lemma 16 shows that A(n,m) and B(n,m) are non-increasing
2
functions of m. For m=n these functions are equal to l/(n+l) .
The assertion follows by lemma 14.
4.7 PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF THE PARTICIPATION
DECISION BRICK. One does not have to look at the question which
are the pure strategyequilibriumpoints of r if one wants to
find the solutionof r, but with respect to the interpretation
of the solution it is of some interest to know the answer to
this question. The pure strategy equilibrium points can be
classified according to the number k of non-participators. In
the case k=O we speak of a joint profit maximization equilibrium
point. Here the joint gross profit of all players is the
monopoly gross profi~ 1/4. If k is greater than 0 but smaller
than (n-l)/2, then we speak of a partial cartel equilibrium
point. Here the behavior of the players results in a cartel
bargaining subgame, whose solution requires an essential cartel
agreement, which is partial, since it does not include the
non-participators. In the case k~ (n-l)/2 we speak of an
unrestricted Cournot equilibrium point. Here every player
2
receives the payoff l/(n+l) which is the gross profit connected
to the Cournot solution of the model without any quota restrie-
tions.
As we shall see, for small n, up to n=4 joint profit
equilibriumpoints are availablebut not for n ~ 4. This is the
reason why 4 is small, but 5 is not: Partial cartel equilibria
can be found for every n with n~4. The number of non-partiei-
pators must be either equal to (n-3)/2 or to (n-2)/2.This means
that for every n~4 there is only one possibility for the number
n
k of non-?articipators. There are altogether (k) partial cartel-63-
equi1ibrium points, where
of non~participators. All
rnapped into each other by






THEOREM 15. Let Z=(Zl'...'Zn) be a pure strategy combination
for the participation decision brick r. Then Z is an equi1ibriurn
point of f if and on1y if n and the nurnber non-participators k





k = 0 and n ~ 4
o < n-3 -< 2 -
k > n+l --y-
k <n-2 -2
PR09F. In the first part of the proof we show that in all
three cases Z is an equi1ibrium point. For every p1ayer i
let rnibe the nurnberof non-participators in N~{i}. It fo11ows
by lemma 14 that in the case that p1ayer i is a participator,
he has no reason to deviate,if we have D(n,mi)~ o. On the
other hand, if he is a non-participator, he has no reason
to deviate, if we have D(n,mi}~ O.
If (101) is trne, then mi=O ho1ds for i=l,...,n. Equation (90)
yields D(l,O)=O, inequa1ity (89) yie1ds D(2,O} <0 and D(3,0) <0.
Fina11y (87) covers the case n=4.
Now assurne that (102) is satisfied. If ! is a participator,
then we have rni = k. Inequality (89) shows that a participator
has no reason to deviate. If i is a non-participator, then
mi=k-1. Because of (102) we rnust have n~ 4. For n=4 condition
(102) yie1ds rni=O. Equation (87) shows that p1ayer i has no
reason to deviate. The same is true for n ~5 in view of (88)
and (102).-64-
In the case of (103) we have mi ~ (n-1)/2 for i=l,...,n.
This means that in view of (90) nobody has a reason to deviate.
In order to prove that r has no other pure strategy equi1ibrium
points than those covered by (101) ,(102) and (103), we observe
that kmust satisfy one of the fo11owing two conditions (104)
and (105), if the former three conditions are not satisfied
by k:
Consider the case (104) and assurne that p1ayer i is a
participator. We have mi = k and (88) shows that p1ayer i has
a reason to deviate. Now consider case (105) and assume that
p1ayer i is a non-participator. We have mi = k-l and (89) shows
that player i has a reason to deviate.
REMARK. Note that generally (103) a1lows us to find very many
unrestricted Cournot equilibrium points. All these equilibrium
points are very weak in the sense that no player can loose
anything by a deviation as we can see from lemma 17. For n = 2
and n = 3 the joint profit maximization equilibrium point is
strong in the sense that a deviation of a player decreases his
payoff. This is not true for n = 1 and n = 4, for n ~5 the
partial cartel equilibrium points are strong in the same sense.
Here n = 4 is an exception. For n~ 5 the strongness of the
partial cartel equilibrium points is due to (88) and (89);
inequality (88) does not include n = 4.
4.8 MIXED STRATEGYE UILIBRIUM POINTS OF THE PARTICIPATION
DECISION BRICK. We shall not try to get a completeoverview
over the mixed strategyequilibriumpoints of f, but we must
look at some of their properties in order to derive the solution
of r.
(104) n-3 and n> 5 k < '--- 2
(105) n-1 n - <k "2 2 --65-
A mixed strategy combination of the participation decis~on
brick r can be representedby a vector of probabilities
(106)
with
(107) o ~w i ~ 1 for i = 1.,...,n
where wi is the probability that player
In the following this representation of
mixed stnategy combinations will always
Hn(W) ) is the payoff vector associated
i selects zi = 1.
mixed strategies and
be used. H(W)=(H1(W) ,...,
with w.
LEMMA 18. Let w = (w1,'.. .,wn) be a mixed stzrategy eauilibrium
point for r with
PROOF. . Let Aj be the payoff of player j which he receives
if he selects z.=O, while all the other players i use their J
mixed strategies wi in w. Similarly let Bj be the payoff of
player j, if he uses zj=l while the others use Wie Let Aj'
and B'Ibe defined in the same way for player jl. Let W be J m
the probability that exactly m of the players in N-{j}-{i'}become
non-participators, if these players use their mixed strategies
Wie We have: n-2 n-2
~ t'lmA(n,m) + (l-w4t) >= WmA(n,m+l) m=O J m=O







hold for B. ,A., and Bj': J J
fB (n ,m+l) + Wj,(B (n ,m) -B (n,m+l»)] L.
(108 ) H. (w) > -L___
J (n+l)2
for some player j. Then wj > W j implies
(109) Hj(W)
< H., (w) J
(110) A. = w'l J J








Wm L.A(n,m+1) + Wj(A(n,m) - A(n,m+1V I
(114)
n-2
Bj' =L ~ m=O Wm[B(n,m+1) + wj(A(n,m) - B(n,m+1~j
Since W is an equi1ibrium point, the fo11owing must be true:
(117)
and
(118) H,(w) = B. J J
As we sha11 see in ca se (117) there must be at least one m with
Wm>0 such that A(n,m)- A(n,m+1) is negative and in case (118)
there must be at least one m with W >0 such that B(n,m) m
B(n,m+1) is negative. Cobsider the case (117). Let m' be the
sma11est number with Wm, >0. Suppose that the difference
A(n,m) - A(n,m+1) vanishes for m = m'. Then this difference
also vanishes for all m~m'. This fo11ows by (94) and (95).
Moreover because A(n,m) is equa1 to 1/(n+1)2, equation (111)
2
yie1ds Aj = 1/(n+1) . Since this is exc1uded by (108), the
difference A(n,m) - A(n,m+1) is negative for m = m'. In the
same way it can be shown that in the case (118) the difference
B(n,m) - B(n,m+1) must be negative for m = m'.
In view of this resu1t a comparison of (111) and (113) shows
that because of w. > W
j , the fo11owingis true for A.~ B,: J J J
(115) H, (w)
;- l = max
Aj ,BjJ J
(116) H'I(W) = max rA ." B ,,1 J ' J J: -
Let us distinguish the two (over1apping) cases-67-
(119) = A. < A. I < H..(w)
J J - J
Sirni1ar1 y (112) and (114) Yie1d in the ease of B.> A.:
J- J
(120)
LEMMA 19. Let Z=(Zl'...'Zn) be a pure strategy equi1ibriurn
point of the partieipation deeision briek r where the number
k of non-partieipatorssatisfies0 < k < n(i. e. Z is a partial
earte1 equ11ibriurnpoint). Then for z. = 1 and Z'. = 0 we have J J
(121)
- 1
Hj,(Z) > Hj(Z) > "-;;1\2
PROOF. k sat1sf1es (102). Therefore (96) shows that B(n,k-1)
2
1s greater than 1/(n+1) . The payoff Hj(Z) 1s equa1 to B(n,k-1).
It fo11ows by the app1ieation of (120) to the special ease of
z, that (121) is true.
LEMMA 20. Let S be a symmetry preserving equi1ibriurnset of
1
the partieipation deeision br1ekf with
- - 1
(122) Hi (S) > 2 for i = 1,...,n (n+1)
Let w = (w1' ,wn) be an equ11ibrium point in S. Then we have
(123) w. ~ for i = 2,...,n
PROOF. r is eornp1ete1ysymmetrie. Therefore the payoff at S
is the same for every p1aver i. If (123) were not true, then in
view of (122) lemma 18 eou1d be app1ied to w; this wou1d lead
to the eone1usion that the payoffs of two p1ayers are not equa1
at w.
4.9 THE SOLUTION OF THE PARTICIPATION DECISION BRICK. With the
he1p of the resu1ts of the last seetion, it is now possib1e
to find the solutionof r. First a theoremwill show that ~or-68-
n > 1 the game r has exact1y one equi1ibrium point with the
properties (122) and (123). This equi1ibrium point turns out
to be the on1y element in the distinguished equi1ibrium set
of r.
THEOREM 16. For n > 1 the participation decision brick r
has exact1y one equi1ibrium point w=(w1'...,wn) with the
properties (122) and (123). Moreover the fo11owing is true
for this equi1ibrium point:
(124) w1 = 1 for 1 < n < 4
(125) o < w1< 1 for n > 4
PROOF. The possibi1ity w1=O is exc1uded by (122), since
w1=O leads to the payoff 1/(n+1)2for all p1ayers. Henceforth
we sha11 assume w1>O. The pure strategy zi=O is a best rep1y
of p1ayer i to w if and on1y if the fo11owing expression D
is non-negative.
n-1
r-' n-1 n-m m
(126) D = LI (m )w1 (l-T"l) D(n,m)
m=O
It is a consequence of the definition of D(n,m) that D is
nothing else than p1ayer i's payoff for zi=O minus p1ayer i's
payoff for zi=l, if the other p1ayers use their strategies
wi in w. The pure strategy zi=l is a best rep1y to w, if and




-,:- ~ In < n-2 , --r
Obvious1y for every n there is exact1y one such number m.








( m )w1 (1-w1) D(n,m)-69-
For n=2 and n=3 we have ffi=O.Inequa1ity (89) shows that
D(2,0) and D(3,0) are negative. Therefore in these two cases
D is negative for every wi with 0 < w1 < 1. The same is also
true for n=4 where m assurnes the va1ue 1; here we have D(4,O) =0
by (87) and D(4,1) < 0 by (89). Por any equi1ibrium point w
with 0 < w1 < 1 the expressionD must vanish since both zi=O
and zi=l are best rep1ies to w. Since D is negative for every
w1 with 0 < w1 < 1 in the cases n=2, n=3 and n=4, this shows,
that in these cases the joint profit maximization equilibrium
point with w1=1 is the only equilibrium point with the
properties (122) and (123).
In the fol1owing we shall assume n>4. Theorem 15 shows, that
there is no joint profit maximization equi1ibrium point for n>4.
Thereforewe must have 0 < w1 < 1. Define
(129)
n-ffi In
If one divides D by w1 (1-w1), one receives
D' = ~ (n-l)hm-nD(n1m) = 0
m=O m
(130)
Obvious1y for 0 < w1 < 1 the expression D' vanishes, if and
on1y if 0 vanishes. The condition 0=0 is not on1y necessary
but also sufficient for a strategy combination w with (122),
(123) and (125) beinq an equi1ibrium point. This shows that
we in order to find these equilibrium points we have to look for
the solutions of the equation:
m 1 -
\ n_"1 n- m-m
/ ( )h 0 (n,m) =0
"m=Ö m
(131)-70-
It remains to be shown that for n>4 equation (131) has
exact1y one positive solution h. From this h the unique1y




It can be seen from (88) ,(89) and (127) that the fol1owing
is true
(133) D (n,m) > 0 for m < ffi and n > 4
(134) D (n,m) < 0 for n > 4
In order to make use of this fact we rewrite (131) as
follows
(135)
For n>4 the 1eft side of (135) is an increasing function of h
which goes to infinity as h goes to infinity. The right side
of (135) is a positive constant. This means that (135) has
exact1y one positive solution h. The proof of the theorem
has shown that the fo11owing corre1ary is true:
CORRELARY. For n>4 the probability w1 belonging to the
unique1y determined equilibrium point w= (w1,...""n) of r with
the properties (122) and (123) can be computed by (132) where
h is the unique positive solution of (135) and m is that integer
which satiafies (127).
THEOREM 17. The participation decision brick r is a distinguished
simultaneity game. For n>l the distinguished equi1ibrium set S
of f contains exact1y one equi1ibrium point. For n=1,...,4 the
distinguished equi1ibrium set S contains the joint profit
maximization equi1ibrium point where every p1ayer a1ways chooses
to participate. For n~5 the equi1ibrium point s € S is a
mixed strategy equi1ibrium point where each p1ayer chooses to-71-
participate with the same probability wl with 0 < wl < 1.
This probability can be computed by (132), where h is the
unique positive solution of (135).
PROOF. Obviously in the trivial case n=l the joint profit
maximization equilibrium point is in S. Apart from this the
theorem is an immediate consequence of lemma 20, theorem 16
and the correlary of theorem 16.
4.10 THE SOLUTION OF THE MODEL. In section 2.10 we have seen
that aperfeet equilibrium set is fully determined by the
equilibrium sets induced on the brieks of the game. In the
preeeding seetions the L-bricks of r have been eonstrueted
and their solutions have been determined (theorems 11,12,13
and 17). Sinee all the L-brieks are distinguished simultaneity
games, the qame r is in the region of the distinguished solution
function. The solution of r ean be charaeterized as folIows:
THEOREM 18. The distinguished solution of r is the set S
of all strategy combinations s for r with the property that
the strategy eombinations induced by s on the supply deeision
subgames r on the truncatedcartel bargaininqsubgamesTZ y, -
and on the partieipation decision brick r are in the
distinguished equilibrium sets of these games.
PROOF. Obviously S is a brick producing set. S satisfies the
condl t I.ons 1) and 2) in theorem3. ThereforeS is a perfect
equilibrium set. In view of the subgame consistency and the
truneation eonsisteney of the distinguished solution function,
it is clear that S is the solution of r.
4.11 THE PARTICIPATION PROBABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF THE
NUMBER OF PLAYERS. For n > 1 the solutionpreseribesa uniquely
determined probability of choosing zi=l. We call this probability
wl the partieipation probability. Aceording to theorem 16
for n=2,3,4 the participation probability is equal to 1.- --- - --- ---
-72-
por n > 4 the participationprobabilitywl can be computed
as described in the corellary of theorem 16. In the following
the participation probabllity will be denoted by w1(n) 1n order
to indicate its dependence on the number of players. Similarly
the symbol h(n) will be used for the uniquely determined
positive solution of (135). Table 2 in subsection ~l
shows the values of w1(n) for n=2,...,15. It is clear from
this table that wl(n) is not monotonically decreasing. Neverthe-
less within the ranqe of the table w1(n) has a tendency to
decrease, since for n=4,...,13 the difference w1(n+2)-w1(n)
is always negative, even though wl(n) is greater than w1(n-l)
for odd values of n with n > 5. In the followingwe shall
prove that wl(n) is always below a certain upper bound which








let h(n) be the uniquely
(135) and letwl(n) be the
wl computed from h=h(n) by
determined
(132) .
(n-rn) D (n ,m)
roD (n , m -1 )
where rn is the integer determined by (127). We have






\.2 (n-4) (n+ 1) 2
for n=5,7 ,9, . . .
for n=6,8,10,...





(140) b(n+2) < b (n)-73-
Moreover we have
for n=5,6,... . This is a consequence of (133) and (135).
Inequa1ity (142) together with (136) shows that (138) ho1ds
for n=5,6,... . In order to prove (137), we eva1uate the
expression on the right side of (136) with the he1p of (86).
n-m 1
(143) (n~)D(n,m) = (n+1)2 - 4(m+l)
- - m _ 1
(144) roD(n,m-1) = 4 (m+1) 2 4 (-n-m+1)
For n=5,7,9,... the integer in is equa1 to (n-3)/2. In this










(n+5) (n-1) for n=5, 7,. ..
b (n) = (n-4) (n+1) 2
(n-m)D(n,m) =




(146) mD(n ,rn-I) =
(147)
(148)
Now assume n=6,8,10,... . Here in is equa1 to (n-2)/2 and (143)
and (1~4) can be eva1uated as fo11ows
(141) 1im w1(n) = 1im h(n) = 1im ben) = 0
n....ao n....... n....ao
PROOF. h(n) satisfies the inequa1ity
(142)
n-1 n-l -
(m_1)D(n,ffi-l)h(n) -( in )D(n,m)
n+2 1 (150)
(n-ffi)D(n,m) = 2(n+1)2 - !n
n-2 1 (151)
ffiD(n,m-1) = 2n2 - 2(n+4)





b (n) = . _ : 'i for n=6, 8, ...
In view of the fact that h/(l+h) is a monotonica11y increasing
function of h, it is c1ear that (139) is a consequence of (138).
Since both for n=5,7,... and n=6,8,... the nominator of ben)
is quadratic in n whereas the denominator is cubic in n, one
can see immediate1y, that (141) ho1ds. In order to prove (140)
we look at the derivatives of the logarithms of the expressions
on the right side of (137). In this way one can see that (140)
ho1ds for n=5,7,... if we have





Since n-4 is sma11er than n-1 and n+1 is sma11er than n+5, the
right side of (155) is negative. Simi1ar1y for n=6,8,...
inequa1ity (140) is imp1ied by
111 2
n+4 + n- n-4 - n+1 < 0 (156)
4.12 THE CARTEL PROBABILITY. On the basis of the assumption
that the sol~tion of the model correct1y describes the behavior
of the oligopo1ists, it is interesting to ask the question,
how often it will occur that the oligopo1ists use the cooperative
possibi1ities of the carte1 bargaining stage in order to co11ude
in a significant way. As an answer to this not yet precise
question we sha11 define a "carte1 probability".
As we know from 4.4, in the carte1 bargaining stage the
character of the behavior prescribed by the equi1ibrium points
in the solution of the model crucia11y depends on the number k
of non-participators. For k ~ (n-1)/2 an equi1ibrium point in
the solution may lead to carte1 agreements, but these carte1-75-
agreements are inessential. The equilibrium payoffs in the
cartel bargaining subgame are those, which would be obtained,
if no cartels were possible.
Contrary to this for k«n-I)/2, the cooperative possibilities
of the cartel bargaining stage are used at the equilibrium
points in the solution. The participators receive greater gross
profits than they could get without cartel agreements. Moreover,
since their joint gross profit is equal to the upper bound
on the right side of (48), one can say that they make the best
possible use of their opportunity to form cartels.
In view of what has been said, it is convenient to intorudce
the following way of speaking. We say that a cartel arrangement
is reached by an eauilibrium point s of r in a cartel bargaining
subgame rz' if the equilibrium point Sz induced by s on rZ
has the property that for each of the participators the
2
equilibrium payoff at Sz is greater than the payoff l/(l+n) ,
'Jhichis achieved at the unrestricted Cournot equilibrium. If
a cartel arrangement is reached by s in rz,then the players in
Z are called insiders and the players in N-Z are called out-
siders with respect to the cartel arrangement.
Obviously for all eauilibrium points s in the solution a cartel
arrangement is reached by s in rZ' if and only if the number k
of non-participators is smaller than (n-I)/2. The probability
that k will be smaller than (n-I)/2 if an equilibrium point s
in the solution is played is the same one for all eauilibrium
points in the solution. This is trivially true for n=l, where
the case k«n-I)/2 cannot occur; for n=2,3,... everyequilibrium
point in L(r) prescribes the same behavior in the participation
decision stage, namely the selection of zi=l with probability
wI(n); the probability that k will be smaller than (n-I)/2 is
uniquely determined by wI(n). This suggests the following
definition: The cartel probability is the probability that a
cartel arrangement will be reached if an eauilibrium point in
L(r) is played. The symbol Wen) will be used for this cartel
probability.-76-
As we have seen above, W(n) is the probability that k will
be smaller than (n-l)/2. Obviously we have
(157) W(l) = 0
(158) W(n) = 1 for n = 2,3,4.
For n=5,6,... the cartel probability can be computed as
folIows:
m
W(n) = E W(n,k)
k=o




is the probability that there will be exactly k non-participators
if the players choose to participate with probability wl(n).
4.14 THE CARTEL PROBABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF
PLAYERS. Table 2 in subsection 5.1 shows the values of
W(n) for 2,...,9. It is clear from this table that W(n) does
not monotonically decrease as a function of n. A weaker
statement about W(n) will be proved in the following. It will
be shown, that W(n~ is below a certain upper bound which goes
to zero as n goes to infinity. With the help of this upper
bound it can be seen, that W(n) is very small outside the table.
A further property of D(n,m) is needed, in order to derive these
results.
LEMMA 21. D(n,m) has the following property
(161) D (n,m+l) < D (n ,m)











In order to prove the lemma it is sufficient to show that the
fo11owing is true:
In order to find an upper bound for the right side of (164) we
make use of the fact that m+2 is notgreater than 2(m+1) and that
n-2m-1 is sma11er than n-m:
LEMMA 22. For n=S,6,... the carte1 probability W(n) has the
fo11owing property:
I mb(n) _
(167) W(n) ~ 1+ n-ffi+1 W(n,m)
L
where m is the integer satisfying (127) and W(n,k) is defined
by (160).
PROOF. As we have seen in the proof of theorem 19 expressionD
in (128) is equa1 to zero for n=5,6,..., since there w1(n)
is positive and sma11er than 1, which has the consequence that
both zi=O and zi=l are best replies to w in r. If one makes
use of
(168) (n-l) = (n)n-m+l m m n
the equation D = 0 can be written as follows
(169)~ W(n,m)n-~+lD(n,m) = 0
m=o
(163) a D(n ,m) < 0 for 0 m.sm-1 am
(162) yie1ds
(164) a D(n,m) = _ 1 n-2m-1 +
am
2(m+2)3 4 (n-m) 2 (m+1) 2
(16 S) a D(n ,m) 1 + 1 < -
2 (n-m) (m+1) (m+2) 3m -
2(m+2)3
In view of (162) this is equiva1ent to
(166) 3 D(n ,m) 2 < -
m+2 D(n,m) 3m -
(88) shows that D(n,m) is positive for m=1,...,ffi-1-78-
It fo11ows by (161) .and (88) that for m=1,...,m-1 we have
(170) D (n ,m) ~ D (n,fii-1) > 0
Define
(171) W' = Wen) - W(n,ffi)
In view of (170) equation (169) imp1ies the fo11owing
inequa1ity
(172) w.n-rn+1 D(n,m-1) n
n-m
< - W(n,m)- D(n,m) n
With the he1p of (136) it can be seen that this is equiva1ent
to
(173)
(167) is an immediate consequence of (173) and (171).




W ( n in ) < (~ ) b (n)
, - m +b n (174)
where m is the integer satisfying (127).
PROOF. For the sake of shortness we sha11 sometimes write
w1 and b instead of w1(n) and ben) resp. Obvious1y we have
(175)
Therefore it is sufficient to show that the fo11owing is true:
(176)-79-
In order to prove this we show that the derivative
(177)
is non-negativein the interval0 ~ w1 ~ b/(l+b). This





Condition (178) is equiva1ent to
(179)
(180) shows that (179) ho1ds for n=5. Since (n-m)/n is a1ways
greater than 1 and both b(6) and b(7) are a1ready smal1er
than 1, it can be seen with the he1p of (140) that (179) is
satisfied for n=5,6,7,... .
THEOREM 20. For n=5,6,... define
(183) V(n) = ~+ rob JnÜ
(
~\
) LJ n-m+fJ m
._~ (n)] n-ffi
:1+b (n)l n- -
where m is the integer determined by
as in (137). The carte1 probabi1ity
fo11owing inequa1ity
(127) and ben) is defined
Wen) satisfies the
(184) Wen) .5 V(n) for n=5,6,...
With the he1p of (137) we can compute
(180) b(5) = 1.111
(181) b(6) = .306
(182) b(7) = .375-80-
Moreover we have
(185) V(n+2) <V(n) for n=5,6,...
and
(186) 11m Wen) = 'lim V(n) = 0
PROOF. (184) follows by lemma 22 and lemma 23. Since h/(l+h)
is a monotonically increasing function of h it follows by





for n=5,6,... . In the same way as (176) has been proved in
the proof of lemma 24, one can see that (177) implies an
inequality analoguous to (177), where wl corresponds to
b(n+2)/(1+b(n+2» and b corresponds to ben). If one makes








This inequality will be used in order to prove (184). In order
to do this we also have to use the following equation, which










-. (n+2)n ~for n=6,8,...
2 (n-4) (n+l~
It can be seen easily that the derivatives of the logarithms
of the expressions on the right side of (189) with respect to n
are negative :therefore the first factor in (183) is decreased,
if n is increased by 2. This together with (188) shows that










Here it 1s important to notice that m is a1ways increased








Since m+1 is not sma11er than (n-1)/2 and (n-m+1) is not
sma11er than (n+4)/2 we have
(192) (n+2) (n+1) (n+1) (n+2)
(ffi+1) (n-m+l) .:! 4 (n-1) (n+4)
(192) .is equiva1ent to
(193) (n+2)(n+1) ~ 4 + 28
Obvious1y the expression on the right side of (193) is a
monotonica11y decreasing function of n. For n=5 this expression
assurnes the va1ue 4.77778.
This shows that the fo11owing is true for n=5,6,...




(195) ~b (- --E-j = .1-b.
(1+b)2 (1+b)4
is positive in the interva1 0< b < 1, ';Je can conc1ude from
(196) b(7)





that in view of (140) we have
_ _b(n+2) < .19835
[1+b(n+2)J2 -
for n=5,6,... . This together with (195) and (197) yie1ds
(198)
(199) V(n+2) ~ .94768 yen) for n=5,6,...
(186) is an immediate consequence of (199).
REMARK. Tab1e 2 in subsection 5.1 contains the statement
that for n-10,11,...the carte1 probabilityWen) is sma11er
than .0001. for n=10,...,15 the computationof Wen) from w1(n)
shows that this is true. V(15) and V(16) are both sma11er than
.0000001. Therefore it fo11ows by (184) and (185) that for
n=15,16,... the carte1 probability is be10w .0000001.-83-
5. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESDLTS.
It is the purpose of this section to discuss the intuitive
significance of the results obtained in section 4 and to draw
some heuristic conclusions with respect to possible generaliza-
tions to more complicated models. An informal description of
the solution of the model is given, mainly for the benefit of
those readers who are not interested in technical details.
5.1 WHAT HAPPENS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE MODEL. Technically
the solution of the model is a set of equilibrium points. Mainly
in the cartel bargaining stage differences between the
equilibrium points in the solution arise, but these differences
are unimportant, since all the equilibrium points in the
solution lead to the same equilibrium payoffs, not only in the
game as whole, but also in every subgame.
In order to have an easy way of speaking about the behavior
at the solution,a distinction between a cartel agreement and
a cartel arrangement has been introduced in 4.12. Since the
formation of cartels is costless, the solution does not exclude
that economically ineffective cartel agreements are reached,
where nothing can be gained by a cartel. Thus for example it
may happen, that the participators agree to limit their supplies
by very high quotas which do not restrict them in any significant
way. In such cases we say that the cartel agreements do not
constitute a cartel arrangement. We speak of a cartel arrange-
ment, if the participatorssuccessfully use the possibilities
of cartel formation in order to get a higher profit, than they
would get, if cartels were not possible.
Let us first look at the trivial case n=l which has the
pecularity that the solution permits any behavior at the
participation decision stage. This is due to the fact that
here the participation decision stage is strategically irrelevant.
As a participator at the cartel bargaining stage the monopolist
should not fix a quota below his monopoly supply 1/2, but
apart from that the solution permits anything. In the supply-84-
decision stage the monopolist supp1ies the quantity 1/2.
His payoff is the monopoly gross profit 1/4. The monopolist
never reaches a carte1 arrangement, since he does not need
any carte1 agreements, in order to achieve his monopoly profit.
For n=2,3,... every equi1ibrium point in the solution prescribes
the same behavior in the participation decision stage: each
of the p1ayers decides to participate with the same probability
w1(n). For n=2,...,15 this participation probability w1(n) is
tabulated in tab1e 2. The participation probability w1(n)
goes to 0 as n goes to infinity.
In the carte1 bargaining stage the behavior at the solution
crucia11y depends on the number k of non-participants. Every
equi1ibrium point in the solution has the property that a
carte1 arrangement is reached if and on1y if the number k of
non-participators 1s sma11er than (n-1)/2.
In the case k~(n-l)/2 it may simp1y happen that no carte1
agreement is reached but the solution also permits the
possibi1ity that economica11y ineffective carte1 agreements
are reached. In the case k«n-1)/2 where a carte1 arrangement
occurs, the simp1est way in which this may happen is the
formation of one carte1 where all the participators are members
and have equa1 quotas, such that the quotas of all participators
sum up to the joint quota of 1/2. The joint quota of 1/2
maximizes the joint equi1ibrium payoff of the carte1 in the
supp1y decision subgame after the quota agreement. The solution
also permits the possibi1ity that the participators achieve
the same quota system by splitting into severa1 coa1itions with
seperate carte1 agreements. At least for some n this is possib1e.
In the case k«n-1)/2 where a carte1 arrangement is reached,
the non-participators are also ca11ed outsiders and the
participators are also ca11ed insiders. For various n and k
the equi1ibrium payoffs in the carte1 bargaining subgame at
the solution are given in tab1e 2 under the headings "gross
profit of an insider" and "gross profit of an outsider".Tab1e 2: The solution up to n=15
For n=10,11,...
the carte1 probability






number number gross gross gross partici- probabi- carte1 expected
of of profit profit profit pation 1ity of proba- gross
p1ayers out- of an of an of a probabi- a cartel bi1ity profit
siders in- out- supp1ier 1ity arrange- of an
sider sider in the ment with oligo-
unrestric- k out- polist
ted Cour not siders
equi1ibriwr
n k 1 1 1
4 (n-k) (k+lf 4 (k+1)2
2
w1 (n) W(n,k) W(n) (n+1)
2 0 .1250 .1111 1.0000 1.0000 1.000C .1250
3 0 .0833 .0625 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 .0833
4 0 .0625 1.0000 1.0000 .0400 1.0000 .0625
5 0 .0500 .0404
1 .0312 .0625 .1817
..222] .0278 .5263 .0304
6 0 .0417 .0000
1 .0250 .0625 .0011
2 .0208 .0278 .0118
.01C .0204 .1857 .0205
7 0 .0357 .0000
1 .0208 .0625 .0010
2 .0167 .0278 .0093
.0156 .2380 . .010 .0157
8 0 .0312 .0000
1 .0179 .0625 .0000
2 .0139 .0278 .0000
3 .0125 .0156 .0006
.OOOE .0123 .1067 .0124
9 0 .0278 .0000
1 .0156 .0625 .0000
2 .0119 .0278 .0001











For a cartel bargaining subgame with k~(n-l)/2 the
equilibrium payoffs at the solution are those of the
unrestricted Cournot equilibrium. Fbr n=2,...,9 these
gross profits are also tabulated in table 2.
The solution exhibits a surprising change of behavior at n=5.
For n=2, n=2 and n=4 each of the oligipolists decides to
participate in the cartel bargaining and the outcome of the
cartel bargaining is the maximization of the joint profit
of all players. Ebr n>4 the joint profit maximization by all
players fails to occur at the solution; the mixed strategy
behavior in the participation decision stage only occasionally
results in a cartel bargaining subgame, where all players are
participators. The probability W(n,O) for this event is given
in table 2 under the heading "probability of a cartel arrange-
ment with k outsiders". Already for n=5 this probability is
only .0404 and for n>5 it is always smaller than .0001.
5.2 WHY 4 ARE FEW AND 6 ARE MANY. The probability that a
cartel arrangement is reached, if an equilibrium point in the
solution is played, is called cartel probability. This cartel
probability W(n) is tabulated in table 2. For n=2,3,4 the cartel
probability is equal to 1. One may say that with respect to the
solution of the model up to n=4 the number of oligopolists is
small. For n>5 the cartel probability is approximately 1% or
smaller, whichm~ans thatan outside observer will only rarely
observe a cartel arrangement. Economically for n>5 the
solution is not very different from the behavior which could
be expected, if no cartel agreements were possible. This can
be seen, if one compares the equilibrium payoff at the solution
for the whole game with the equilibrium profit for the unre-
stricted Cournot equilibrium. Both profits are tabulated in
table 2 under the headings lIexpectedgross profit of an
oligipolist" and "gross profit of a supplier at the unrestricted
Cournot equilibriumll,For n>5 the expected gross profit of an
oligopolist at the solution is only slightly greater than the
gross profit of a supplier at the unrestricted Cournot
equilibrium.-
-87-
The case n=5 may be considered an intermediate case, since
here the cartel probability of approximately 22% is still
quite substantial. Note that for n=5 most of the cartel
arrangements are cartel arrangements with 4 insiders and
1 outsider.
Why is n=5 the dividing line between the small group and
the large group? The main reason for this can be explained
with the help of a heuristic argument. Assume that n is at
least 3 and suppose that player j expects that each of the
other players will decide to participate and that the joint
profit of all players will be maximized and split evenly,
if he decides to participate too. If he does not participate,
he expects the others to form a cartel with a joint quota
of 1/2 in order to maximize the joint equilibrium payoff of
the cartel in the supply decision staqe. In the case of the
joint profit maximization by all players his share of the
joint gross profit of 1/4 is equal to 1/4n. If he does not
participate, he becomes an outsider with respect to a cartel
whose total supply is 1/2. His optimal supply will be 1/4,
the price will be 1/4 and his gross profit will be 1/16. The
basic fact is, that up to n=4 the joint gross profit share
of 1/4n is not smaller than the outsider gross profit of
1/16, whereas for n>4 the outsider gross profit is greater than
the joint gross profit share. This destroys the possibility of
a joint profit maximization equilibrium tor n>4.
5.3 THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE PARTICIPATION DECISION
STAGE. In order to understand the strategie situation in the
participation decision stage, one must look at the game which
has been introduced in 4.5 as the "participation decision brick".
The participation decision brick results fram the model, if one
substitutes every cartel bargaining subgame by the payoff
vector which is obtained in this subgame if the players behave
in a way which is compatible with the solution.-88-
In 4.7 the pure strategy equilibrium points of the participation
decision brick have been explored. For n=1,...,4 the partici-
pation decision brick has a "joint profit maximization
equilibrium point", where every player always decides to
participate and a maximal joint profit for all players is
reached. This pure strategy equilibrium point is not available
for n>4. There the only pure strategy equilibrium point which
treats the players symmetrically is the "unrestricted Cournot
equilibrium point", where every player decides not to
participate.
Por n~4 the participation decision brick has "partial cartel
equilibrium points" where for even n exactly (n-2)/2 players
and for odd n exactly (n-3)/2 players are non-participators.
Here the non-participators have higher payoffs than the
participators. The players are treated in an asymmetrical way.
Therefore the symmetry requirement underlying the s~lution
concept of this paper excludes the partial cartel equilibrium
points as possible candidates for a solution of the participation
decision brick. Apart from the lack of symmetry the partial
cartel equilibrium points are quite attractive. Thus for
example in the case n=5 and k=l an insider receives .0312 and
the outsider receives .0625, whereas at the solution every
player receives .0304 only (see table 2.). Nevertheless it is
not implausible to expect that the players will fail to
coordinate their expectations at a partial cartel equilibrium
point, since nobody has more reason than anybody else to be
satisfied with the less profitable role of an insider.
5.4 POSSIBLE GENERALIZATIONS. One may ask the question how
much of the analysis depends on the linearity assumptions
about cost and demand. Only a detailed investiqation can show
what happens if these assumptions are relaxed, but it is a
plausible conjecture that apart from some special cases
one will always find a more or less sharp dividing line between
few and many beyond which the players fail to exhibit the
typical small group behavior. Whether the dividing line will
be at n=5 or somewhere else, will depend on the cost and demand
functions.-89-
The model is symmetrie with respeet to the players. It
would be desirable to develop a theory for a more general
model whieh admits some asymmetries like different eost
funetions for different players. For this purpose one would
need a more general solution eoneept.-90-
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